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Vulnerability and Power in the 
Age of the Anthropocene 
 





 Feminist legal theorist Martha Fineman has suggested 
that recognition of universal human “vulnerability” should be the 
starting point for thinking about the state’s obligations to its 
citizens. This Article argues that Fineman’s concept of 
vulnerability is valuable for situating political and legal theory 
within a concern for the natural world. We live in what some 
scientists have dubbed the Anthropocene—an age in which our 
collective behavior has serious implications for the flourishing of 
all life on earth. The concept of “ecological vulnerability” 
recognizes that humans are vulnerable not only because they age, 
become ill, and die, but because their survival depends on 
complex macro- and micro-ecologies—all of which are, in turn, 
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Workshop students at the University of Houston Law School, and to Ian Haney 
Lopez, Russell Robinson, and the students in their fall 2013 Critical Race 
Theory seminar, where I presented nascent versions of this Article. Portions of 
this Article were also developed in the course of preparing for the 2013 Coen 
Lecture at the University of Colorado – Boulder, and I thank the organizers of 
that lecture series for inviting me, with special and heartfelt thanks to Aya 
Gruber. I would like to thank Pearl Yu-chih Kan and Dayna Nadine Scott for 
inspiring conversations. Laura Gallagher, King Hall Class of 2014, provided 
awesome research assistance in two different languages. Ivan Vargas, a lawyer 
and a doctoral student at Duke University, introduced me to the 2008 Ecuador 
constitution and recent statutory developments in Bolivia, and has been more 
than generous with his time and insights. Tucker Culbertson and Sheila Foster 
read an earlier draft and provided much needed and appreciated suggestions. 
Last but not least, a big shout-out to Frank Rudy Cooper for thinking and 
talking with me about the limits of vulnerability. All mistakes and 
misjudgments, of course, remain mine. 
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vulnerable to harm. Ecological vulnerability can serve as an 
important conceptual bridge between critical legal theory and the 
emerging “green” legal theory, helping to close the gap between 
projects of social justice on one hand and environmental 
sustainability on the other. Misused, however, vulnerability 
analysis can make power relations, and therefore injustice, 
invisible. Legal and political theorists in search of conceptual 
frameworks appropriate to the Anthropocene must therefore be 
careful to incorporate a robust anti-subordination principle into 
their analyses as they adopt the language of ecological 
vulnerability. 
 
Admit that humans have crawled or secreted 
themselves into every corner of the environment; 
admit that the environment is actually inside 
human bodies and minds, and then proceed 
politically, technologically, scientifically, in 
everyday life, with careful forbearance, as you 
might with unruly relatives to whom you are 
inextricably bound and with whom you will engage 
over a lifetime . . . .1 
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In a paper published in 2011, a group of scientists led by 
Will Steffen presented evidence of what they called “The Great 
Acceleration:” a sudden intensification of the impact of human 
activity on the global environment.2 Taking the measure of 
diverse human phenomena, from human population and fertilizer 
consumption to the number of McDonald’s restaurants 
worldwide, the authors generated a series of charts. Each chart 
featured a curve sloping steeply upward, beginning around 1945.3  
Extreme environmental change on planet Earth is nothing 
new.4 As J.R. McNeill points out in his environmental history of 
the twentieth-century world, “[a]steroids and volcanoes, among 
other astronomical and geological forces, have probably produced 
more radical environmental changes than we have yet witnessed 
in our time.”5 Nor is human impact on the biosphere 
unprecedented.6 As beings embedded in biological systems, 
humans have always affected the fortunes of plant and animal 
species around us (and within us, as we will see), and these 
impacts increased as humans began farming, building cities, and 
domesticating other animals.7 However, since the dawn of the 
Industrial Age the scale of human intervention in human and 
trans-human planetary systems has grown dramatically. McNeill 
explains that the transition from reliance on human and animal 
 
2. See Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: Conceptual and 
Historical Perspectives, 369 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL. SOC’Y. A 842, 
851–52 (2011) (charting different measures of human activity from 1750–2000). 
3. See id. (graphing a several categories of human behavior 
indicating 1945 as a time where patterns changed).  
4. See J.R. MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD 3 (2000) (noting 
that “[e]nvironmental change on earth is as old as the planet itself”). 
5.  Id. 
6. See id. at 6 (explaining that, since humanity invented fire, it 
has been polluting the air). 
7. See Steffen et al., supra note 2, at 846–47 (highlighting 
agriculture as one of two pre-industrial events that presaged the Anthropocene 
Era); see also MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that as a species, “we have cut 
timber, mined ores, generated wastes, grown crops, and hunted animals for a 
long time.”). 
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power to reliance on fossil fuels made possible an extraordinary 
growth in energy use:  
 
We have probably deployed more energy since 
1900, than in all of human history before 1900. 
My very rough calculation suggests that the 
world in the twentieth century used 10 times as 
much energy as in the thousand years before 
1900 A.D. In the 100 centuries between the dawn 
of agriculture and 1900, people used only about 
two-thirds as much energy as in the twentieth 
century.8  
 
Although this surge in energy use created the conditions 
for dramatic population growth, longer, healthier lives for 
humans all over the globe, liberation from “the drudgery of 
endless muscular toil,”9 and the flowering of complex human 
cultural products (including but not limited to cute cat videos), 
the surge also came at least two costs. The first has been 
environmental: an intensification of water, soil, and air pollution, 
the loss of arable land and biodiversity, and disruptions in large-
scale and long-term cycles of biology, chemistry and geology as 
carbon and nitrogen circulate between land, sea and 
atmosphere.10 The most dramatic example of these disruptions, of 
course, is global warming.11 Steffen and his co-authors argued 
that these disruptions are so large that they should be 
acknowledged in our measurements of geological time.12 In their 
view, we should declare an end to the Holocene Era, which began 
about 10,000 years ago, and recognize the beginning of the 
“Anthropocene Era.”13  
 
8.  MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 15.  
9.  Id. 
10. See id. at 15–16 (stating that one of the costs of energy 
intensification is the increase of pollution generated by fossil fuel combustion). 
11. See Steffen et al., supra note 2, at 842–43 (addressing the role 
of climate change in the emergence of the Anthropocene). 
12. See id. at 860–62 (discussing the societal implications of 
accepting the concept of the Anthropocene). 
13. See id. at 847 (arguing that the Industrial Revolution set 
human beings on a path away from the Holocene Era).  
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The second cost of humanity’s turn to fossil fuel energy 
has been an increase in economic and political inequality.14 
McNeill observes that “fossil fuel use has sharply increased the 
inequalities in wealth and power among different parts of the 
world.”15 These inequalities are typically discussed in terms of a 
divide between the “developed” and “developing” nations, or the 
“global North” versus the “global South,” where the wealthy 
countries of the “developed” North are contrasted with the poor 
countries of the “developing” South.16 This divide is clearly visible 
in terms of energy use. For example, McNeill notes that “The 
average American in the 1990s used 50 to 100 times as much 
energy as the average Bangladeshi and directed upwards of 75 
energy slaves [human equivalents] while the Bangladeshi had 
less than one.”17 The differential is similarly reflected in 
comparative calculations of “carbon footprints,” a popular 
measure of greenhouse gas production. As Katrina Fischer Kuh 
notes, “The United States citizen’s Sasquatch-sized carbon 
footprint of approximately twenty metric tons of carbon dioxide 
dwarfs the Thumbelina-like footprint, a mere one metric ton, of 
the average Indian citizen.”18 Compounding these production 
inequalities, international trade relations frequently result in the 
 
14. See MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 15–16 (“Harnessing fossil fuels 
played a central (though not exclusive) role in widening the international wealth 
and power differential so conspicuous in modern history.”). 
15.  Id. 
16.  This conventional dichotomy has become increasingly 
misleading as several nations formerly classified as “developing” have rapidly 
industrialized. See Ruth Gordon, The Dawn of a New, New International 
Economic Order? 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 134–38 (2009) (criticizing the 
terms “developed” and “developing” and substituting a tripartite categorization 
of high-, middle-, and low-income nations). Most notably, China, long considered 
a “developing” nation, has become not only a political and economic superpower, 
but also the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter. See Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905, 908 (2008) (discussing 
the scale of China’s greenhouse gas emissions); Ruth Gordon, The 
Environmental Implications of China’s Engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa, 
42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109, 11111 (2012) (discussing China’s 
political and economic strength). 
17.  MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 16. 
18.  Katrina Fischer Kuh, Energy and the Environment: 
Empowering Consumers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 911, 916 (2009). 
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transfer of hazardous waste from the global North to the global 
South.19  
The divide between the global North and the global South 
did not arise by accident. Rather, behind these differentials of 
wealth, energy use, and pollution burden stand the long-term, 
large-scale political projects we now refer to as “colonialism,” 
“imperialism,” and “chattel slavery.”20 The technologies 
associated with the Industrial Revolution and reliance on fossil 
fuel energy over human and animal somatic energy gave 
colonizing nations an edge over colonized nations, intensifying 
the socioeconomic inequalities between them.21 Far from being 
over and done with, the economic, environmental, and social 
effects of these global relations of domination continue today. 
What are the implications of the revolution in human 
energy use and its twin costs—environmental degradation and 
socioeconomic inequality—for legal theory? A large and 
sophisticated legal literature now addresses the regulatory 
implications of global climate change and other environmental 
aspects of the Anthropocene era at the local, national, and 
international scale, from the perspective of environmental law 
and policy.22 There is also a smaller but robust and growing body 
 
19.  Gonzalez explains: 
Hazardous waste generators in the North export wastes to the South 
because strict environmental regulation and citizen opposition to the 
location of waste disposal facilities have increased the cost of waste 
disposal in the North. By contrast, hazardous waste disposal is 
significantly cheaper in the South due to weak environmental 
regulation, lax enforcement, and government corruption. Moreover, 
poverty and debt create powerful incentives for developing countries to 
accept hazardous waste shipments from other nations in order to earn 
badly needed foreign exchange. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-
Imperialism: An Environmental Justice Critique of Free Trade, 78 
DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 989 (2001). 
20. See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and 
Malnutrition: Agricultural Trade Policy Through an Environmental Justice 
Lens, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 345, 357–58 (2011) (explaining how colonialism led 
to “undernourishment and environmental degradation” in colonized states).  
21. See, e.g., Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism, supra note 19, at 
988–92 (describing how disposal of hazardous waste from colonizing nations 
(North) to colonized nations (South) creates inequality in the South). 
 22. See generally, Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and 
Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 
(2011) (examining the use of federal and state tort law to guide governments in 
addressing climate change); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate 
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of work addressing the social implications of climate change, 
including scholarship that brings together environmental law and 
human rights law to consider the obligations of states to 
individuals and groups whose lives have or will be disrupted by 
rising seas and natural disasters.23 However, little has been 
written as yet considering the implications of the Anthropocene 
for critical legal theory. With a few notable exceptions, critical 
legal theorists have concentrated on “social justice” and 
                                                                                                             
Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557 
(2011) (reviewing regulations on industry and the global climate, and providing 
recommendations for the use of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory sphere); 
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The 
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, (2007) (highlighting state 
regulatory action as a tool to develop federal regulations on climate change); 
Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating 
State and Local Governments To Address a Global Problem and What Does This 
Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006) 
(discussing state and local governments’ roles in climate change regulation); 
Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global 
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183 (2005) (advocating 
for a collective, rather than unilateral, approach to climate change). 
 23. See generally, Evadne Grant, Louis Jacobus Kotze & Karen L. 
Morrow, Human Rights and the Environment: In Search of a New Relationship, 
3 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 953 (2013) (Spain), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221302 (summarizing the discussions and themes 
which emerged from the Oñati Workshop on Human Rights and the 
Environment, including “vulnerability; the limits of the law; the limits of rights; 
responsibility; interconnection; and thinking ecologically”) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL ON ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); 
Sofya Manukyan, Can the ICESCR Be an Alternative for Environmental 
Protection? Analysis of the Effectiveness of the ICESCR in Holding State and 
Non-State Actors Accountable for Environmental Degradation (September 10, 
2013) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Essex), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364130 (exploring the use of the ICESCR as a tool to 
establish environmental protection throughout the globe) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL ON ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); 
Timo Koivurova and Sébastien Duyck & Leena Heinämäki, Climate Change and 
Human Rights, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 287 (21 IUS GENTIUM: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336876 
 (Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds, 2013) (describing the relationship between human 
rights and climate change) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL ON 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from 
Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 
24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2005) (analyzing environmental justice litigation from 
international, regional, and United States tribunals to develop an approach to 
addressing environmental justice issues on an international scale). 
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environmental scholars have concentrated on “sustainability,” 
with few overlaps in these distinct conversations.24  
This Article seeks to help bridge the gap. I argue that 
feminist theorist Martha Fineman’s recent work on 
“vulnerability” provides a useful means of integrating critical 
legal theory and environmental scholarship. In a series of 
articles, Fineman argues that law needs a theory of vulnerability 
to supplement anti-subordination theory’s focus on equality 
 
 24. A few environmentally oriented legal scholars have produced 
work that could be understood as “critical environmental theory.” See, e.g., 
Michael M’Gonigle & Louise Takeda, The Liberal Limits of Environmental Law: 
A Green Legal Critique, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1005, 1080 (2013) (calling for a 
“green legal theory”). M’Gonigle and Takeda, however, are silent on the 
connections between social subordination and environmental production and 
destruction. Similarly, Douglas Kysar and Mary Christina Wood have begun the 
task of imagining environmental regulation that would represent a meaningful 
check on growth-oriented capitalism, rather than an accommodation to it. See, 
e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 
677 (2003) (advocating for the use of economics in the regulatory sphere); Mary 
Christina Wood, “You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle”: Environmental Law for a 
New Ecological Age, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 191 (2010) (“Agencies must 
significantly amplify the protection of vital resources, which means that they 
must strengthen their resistance to proposals for private profit that cause 
ecological damage.”). For work situated within philosophy and ethics that begins 
to consider the broad implications of the Anthropocene, see, e.g., Anna M. Grear, 
Towards a New Horizon: in Search of a Renewing Socio-Juridical Imaginary, 3 
OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 966 (2013) (Spain), available at 
opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/viewFile/263/310 (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL ON ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). This work, 
however, similarly fails to address the subordination dimension of the economic-
environmental crisis.  
A few critical legal scholars have begun to consider the implications of 
global climate change for the project of equality. See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, supra 
note 16. In general, however, scholars writing from an environmental justice 
perspective have been the most active in developing the groundwork for a 
critical legal theory of the Anthropocene that takes seriously both justice and 
sustainability. For example, Carmen Gonzalez’s scholarship on food, 
environment, human rights, and international trade relations connects the 
present reality of environmental crisis, the ideologies and institutions of 
international “development,” and the legacies of colonialism and imperialism. 
See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez, The Global Food System, Environmental 
Protection, and Human Rights, 26 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 7 (2012); Carmen G. 
Gonzalez, An Environmental Justice Critique of Comparative Advantage: 
Indigenous Peoples, Trade Policy, and the Mexican Neoliberal Economic 
Reforms, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 723 (2011); Gonzalez, Markets, Monoculture, and 
Malnutrition, supra note 20; Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism, supra note 19.  
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among persons.25 For Fineman, the concept of vulnerability 
reflects the fact that we are “born, live, and die within a fragile 
materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible to 
destructive external forces and internal disintegration.”26 
Fineman further argues that recognizing human vulnerability 
requires that we relinquish, or at least significantly alter, our 
existing theories of the self and of the state.27 Building on 
feminist and postmodern critiques of the autonomous liberal 
subject, Fineman uses the concept of vulnerability to imagine a 
political subject that is not only embedded in human 
relationships, but is also materially and temporally fragile.28 She 
concludes that justice for beings who are made of flesh, who 
sicken, age, and die, and who depend on each other for survival 
requires positive obligations from the state to take care of its 
 
 25. See Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: 
Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 
71, 71 (2012) [hereinafter Elderly as Vulnerable] (“The vulnerability of our 
embodied beings and the messy dependency that often comes in the wake of 
physical or physiological needs cannot be ignored throughout any individual life 
and must be central to theories about what constitutes a just and responsive 
state.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an 
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1719 (2012) 
[hereinafter Beyond Identities] (“[T]he foundational difference between the 
manner in which equality is understood in the United States and how it is 
understood in much of the rest of the world arises from the recognition and 
acceptance in other countries that human need and vulnerability are not only 
an individual responsibility but also a state responsibility.”); Martha Albertson 
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 
256 (2010) [hereinafter Responsive State] (“In this Essay I explore how the 
concept of vulnerability can help us better understand how to actually realize 
that often-glorified American commitment to equality of opportunity and 
access.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring 
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008) 
[hereinafter Vulnerable Subject] (“The vulnerability approach I propose is an 
alternative to traditional equal protection analysis . . . .”). 
 26. See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 25, at 12 
(explaining the tensions explored by vulnerability).  
27.  See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1752 (“My 
argument is that to attain broad general opportunity and access in today’s 
world, the state must be responsive to individual, social, and institutional 
circumstances so that equality is anchored in the realities of the human 
condition and not some abstract and unachievable ‘ideal.’”). 
28. See id. at 1752–53 (explaining that the concept of the 
‘vulnerable subject’ was developed by asking questions regarding how 
individuals handle the concept of the material fragility of existence). 
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citizens, not just the negative obligation to refrain from intrusion 
on their liberty.29 
This Article argues that vulnerability theory provides a 
way to situate theories of political obligation within care for the 
natural world. Vulnerability has always been the reality of 
human life on earth, but today, as Steffens’ charts vividly 
illustrate,30 we are living in “a regime of perpetual ecological 
disturbance”31 that threatens not only human life, but also all life 
on the planet. The advent of the Anthropocene era requires 
heightened awareness of the relationship between humans and 
the environments in which they live, including a series of positive 
obligations of the state vis-à-vis both humans and what we think 
of as “the environment” or “nature.”32 Conceptualizing “ecological 
vulnerability” can help make this relationship visible. However, 
as Fineman acknowledges and I want to underscore, 
vulnerability cannot and should not stand alone as the starting 
place for legal and political theory.33 The language of 
 
29. See id. at 1760 (arguing that the responsive state will be 
generative rather than destructive if it can recognize the complex relationship 
between individuals and institutions, and highlighting the role the state must 
play in the maintenance of that relationship).  
30. See generally Steffen et al., supra note 2 (providing several 
graphs depicting the onset of the Anthropocene).  
31. MCNEILL, supra note 4, at xxiv. 
 32. In this way, my argument parallels the argument of “ecological 
economists,” who situate economic institutions within the natural world. See 
Robert Costanza, Herman E. Daly & Joy A. Bartholomew, Goals, Agenda, and 
Policy Recommendations for Ecological Economics, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: 
THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 5 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991) 
(explaining, in Table 1.1, that Ecological Economics “[a]cknowledges [the] 
interconnections between humans and the rest of nature”); HERMAN E. DALY, 
BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 45–51 (1996) 
(explaining the “elements of environmental economics”); Kysar, Law, 
Environment, and Vision, supra note 24, at 680–93 (2003) (reviewing the 
emergence, tenets, and methodology of ecological economics); Douglas A. Kysar, 
Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 
2115 n. 37 (2005) (describing ecological economics as “a field that is 
distinguishable from neoclassical economics based on its insistence that 
questions of equity and scale should be seen as analytically prior to questions of 
efficiency”).  
33. See Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 25, at 275 
(“Vulnerability analysis is an attempt to articulate a more self-conscious and 
aware egalitarian political culture; one that more robustly adheres to the all-
American promise of equality of opportunity and equal access to the American 
dream. It is those aspirations for substantive equality for the vulnerable subject 
 
6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014) 
 
108 
vulnerability can be used to direct attention away from the social 
and political roots of injury. This Article argues for a view of 
ecological vulnerability that takes a commitment to the 
indivisibility of humans and their environments and a 
commitment to anti-subordination as valuable checks on one 
another—supplements, rather than substitutes. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A begins with a 
brief review of Fineman’s theory of vulnerability.34 In subsection 
B, relying on recent efforts of economists and natural scientists to 
understand and account for the macro- and micro-ecologies in 
which human life is embedded, I argue that Fineman’s 
descriptive account of vulnerability can be extended by 
considering the human body as dependent on—indeed, perhaps 
unimaginable apart from—a series of flows and interactions with 
the non-human world.35 The concept of “ecological vulnerability” 
helps us imagine the bearer of legal rights as a fully embodied 
subject whose body is inseparable from “the environment.” In 
Part III, I consider some of the implications of ecological 
vulnerability for legal and political governance. Subsection A 
reviews some accounts of the ecologically vulnerable subject 
developed by theorists of “materiality” in the humanities.36 In 
subsection B, I derive from their work two first principles for 
responding to ecological vulnerability in law.37 First, the state has 
a fundamental obligation of environmental protection that is 
indivisible from its obligation to protect human rights (the 
“indivisibility principle”). Second, a critical analysis of power is 
necessary to supplement vulnerability analysis (the “anti-
subordination principle”). Finally, subsection C takes note of 
some existing models for ecological vulnerability in policy, 
politics, and law, including the policy frame of “just 
sustainabilities,” the political theory and advocacy of the 
environmental justice movement, and recent legal developments 
in Latin America.38 It concludes that a vulnerability analysis 
                                                                                                             
that should form the ultimate ideals against which the state and its societal 
institutions and their actions are judged.”).  
34. See infra Part II.A.  
35. See infra Part II.B. 
36. See infra Part III.A. 
37. See infra Part III.B. 
38. See infra Part III.C. 
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requires us to recognize ecological vulnerability as part and 
parcel of humans’ “fragile materiality.” 
 
II. Toward a Theory of Ecological Vulnerability 
 
A. Fineman and Vulnerability 
 
Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability begins with the 
observation that United States constitutional equality norms are 
narrow compared to those of nations with more recently drafted 
constitutions.39 American constitutional equality, driven by the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,40 is “understood narrowly 
as only the requirement of sameness of treatment between 
different social classifications.”41 Even the guarantee of identical 
treatment applies unevenly: some group classifications receive 
strict judicial scrutiny, such as race; others, like gender, receive 
intermediate scrutiny; and still others, such as poverty, are not 
recognized at all as sources of constitutional violation.42 
Moreover, Fineman continues, the guarantee of identical 
treatment focuses on individuals, not groups, and has little to say 
about group-wide disadvantage or access to opportunity 
structures.43 Rights to the remediation of historic group harms, 
 
39. See Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 25, at 253–54 
(explaining that the United States, when compared to European countries, has 
ratified far fewer provisions that would improve current understanding of the 
government’s role in equality). 
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  
 41. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1727. 
42. See id. at 1727–28 (explaining which classifications are subject 
to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review); see 
generally Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People 
from Equal Constitutional Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023 (2012) (criticizing 
the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize poverty as a classification meriting 
heightened scrutiny). 
43. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1728 (“[T]he 
guarantee of equal protection law is understood, even for the most protected 
individuals, as a prohibition against arbitrary discrimination and not as some 
broader inquiry into subordination or relative disadvantage.”). 
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like slavery, sit uncomfortably with the norm of identical 
treatment of individuals without regard to group identity; for 
example, “affirmative action” in the United States is a vexed 
concept subject to political and legal attack because it violates 
this norm.44 
The U.S. jurisprudence of equality is also framed by “first 
generation” negative human rights—rights to be let alone by the 
state—rather than second- or third-generation “positive” 
economic and social rights, such as rights to education, housing, 
or an adequate standard of living.45 As Fineman writes, 
  
The paramount tenet of individual liberty is that 
the individual must have the autonomy to make 
choices independent of state interference. This 
principle informs our economic, legal, and political 
theories and is indispensable to the rhetoric of 
personal responsibility that pervades current 
discussions about entitlement reform. What 
Americans have instead of social and 
socioeconomic rights is liberty or autonomy—the 
right to make choices, the right to contract.46 
 
In American political and social life, “vulnerability” is a 
stigmatized condition, characterizing certain groups—such as 
children, the elderly, and the ill—that are understood as lacking 
the capacity to fully exercise political and social autonomy.47 In 
this conception, vulnerable populations are perceived as the 
 
 44. See id. at 1742–43 (“[R]ecent concerns regarding reverse 
discrimination and “innocent” third parties, as well as the controversy over the 
use of strict scrutiny in such cases, has raised doubts about the future of 
affirmative action in American jurisprudence.”). 
45. See id. at 1722–23 (“[T]here is a significant divergence between 
the U.S. Constitution and roughly eighty percent of the rest of the world which 
has articulated the right to have basic physical needs met through the provision 
of “second-generation [human] rights” such as state guarantees of medical care 
and food.”).  
 46. Id. at 1747–48 (citations omitted). 
47. See id. at 1748 (“Those who cannot effectively exercise their 
right to contract because they are not sufficiently capable, independent, and 
autonomous actors are herded together in designated “vulnerable populations,” 
a designation that functionally operates as a proxy for need and dependency and 
renders those within it susceptible to monitoring and supervision.”).  
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opposite of the “normal” political subject. Fineman puts the point 
this way:  
 
The very idea of vulnerable populations situates 
and validates an opposite and binary ideal—a 
population of autonomous, self-sufficient, and 
independent liberal subjects. These liberal subjects 
are conceived of as invulnerable, or, at the very 
least, as expressing only a different, more 
acceptable vulnerability while still successfully 
achieving independence, self-sufficiency, and 
autonomy. They are the taxpayers, the job creators, 
the heads of households, and the pillars of the 
community.48 
 
But because all human beings are born, live, and die in 
fragile bodies, “vulnerability” is the rule, not the exception.49 The 
 
 48. Id. at 1751 (citations omitted). Vulnerability used in this 
conventional way overlaps with “dependency,” a stigmatized characteristic 
attributed to similar groups—single mothers, children, the poor. See id. at 1748. 
As Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon observed decades ago, in American 
policymaking and politics to be dependent (on the welfare state, for instance) is 
considered morally suspect; the normal citizen is expected to need nothing from 
the state beyond the bare minimum of protections against force and fraud. See 
Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword 
of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 309 (1994), available at 
www.jstor.org/stable/3174801 (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). As Fineman and Fraser and Gordon 
observe, of course, identifying only certain groups as vulnerable obscures the 
fact that no one is invulnerable. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 
1750 (“This targeted-group approach to vulnerability ignores its universality 
and inappropriately constructs relationships of difference and distance between 
individuals and groups within society.”). Vulnerability in the sense of 
dependency is also a highly negatively charged term in our society. See Fraser & 
Gordon, Genealogy of Dependency, at 311 (“The term carries strong emotive and 
visual associations and a powerful pejorative charge.”).  
49. As Fineman poignantly writes: 
The idea of the “vulnerable subject” as the appropriate legal and 
political subject arose from asking two fundamental questions: (1) What 
should be the political and legal implications of the fact that we are 
embodied beings, which means we are born, live, and die within a 
fragile materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible to both 
internal and external forces beyond our control? (2) What accounts for 
the lack of consideration given by our political, economic, and legal 
systems to the messy but inescapable dependency of human nature, 
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typical human moves through a “life-course,” experiencing 
various forms of dependency and interdependency from birth to 
death.50 The typical human is also subject to internal and 
external circumstances over which she has little or no control—
both negative, such as disease, crime, and disaster, and positive, 
such as being born into a wealthy family or into a privileged 
racial, ethnic, or gender identity.51 These sources of vulnerability 
are institutional and structural in nature, and Fineman argues 
that a state committed to equality should respond to them. 52 
 According to Fineman, then, it is the state’s responsibility 
not only to respond to individual acts of discrimination against 
people on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics over 
which they have no control, but also to respond to unequal 
opportunities produced by social structures and institutions.53 
For Fineman, the just state is one that valorizes “political 
responsibility” as well as personal responsibility.54 Political 
responsibility “ensure[s] access to and opportunities within the 
institutions that have been entrusted with generating and 
allocating wealth, power, and position in a market society.”55 In 
                                                                                                             
marked as it is by “bodily needs, desires, and yearnings?” Fineman, 
Beyond Identities, at 1752–53.  
50. See Fineman, id. at 1753 (“[T]he concept of the vulnerable 
subject is built around the idea of ‘life-course,’ reflecting a range of 
developmental and social stages through which individuals are likely to pass in 
the course of a normal lifespan.”).  
51. See id. (“[T]he individual will encounter a myriad of 
opportunities, frustrations, challenges, and experiences during his or her life, 
necessitating a wide range of expertise and capabilities.”).  
 52. Fineman writes: 
We are all differently situated within webs of economic and 
institutional relationships that structure our options and create 
opportunities. This form of difference focuses us on institutional 
arrangements and makes it hard to ignore the realization that in order 
to have a more robust equality-based society it will be necessary to 
move beyond individual identities and discrimination as it is now 
understood and adopt a more structural and institutional perspective. 
Id. at 1755. 
53. See id. at 1760 (advocating for a responsive state which views 
individuals and institutions as “intertwined”).  
54. See id. at 1762 (“[T]he responsive state begins and ends with 
the concept of political responsibility.”).  
 55. Id. Property theorist Gregory Alexander articulates a similar 
set of propositions:  
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place of the state of limited powers that historically shaped 
American law and politics, Fineman proposes a “responsive 
state:” 
 
The responsive state views individuals and 
institutions as intertwined, symbiotic, and 
interdependent with each other and also with the 
state and its apparatus. Institutions are shaped 
through law and their operation profoundly affects 
individual options, opportunities, and well-being 
and the ability of the state to effectively govern. 
State responsiveness recognizes that the 
intertwining of the individual with the institutional 
can be either generative or destructive, warranting 
supervision and correction by the only entity 
capable of doing so: the modern state. This state, in 
turn, should be understood as a cluster of 
relationships, institutions, and agencies reflecting 
and shaping public norms and values through law 
and policy. Those relationships include the 
relationship between citizen and state, as well as 
between state and institutions. In a responsive 
state individuals realize that they too comprise the 
state and instead of standing outside of it they 
have a responsibility to see it is working effectively. 
Perhaps we could call this relationship 
“democracy.”56 
 
                                                                                                             
Social structures, including distributions of [legal] rights and the 
definition of the rights that go along with the ownership of property, 
should be judged, at least in part, by the degree to which they foster the 
participation by human beings in these objectively valuable patterns of 
existence and interaction. . . .  
 
As a matter of human dignity, every person is equally entitled to 
flourish. This being so, every person must be equally entitled to those 
things essential for human flourishing, i.e., the capabilities that are the 
foundation of flourishing and the material resources required to 
nurture those capabilities. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation 
Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 764, 768 
(2009). 
 56. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1760. 
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B. The “Environmentally Embedded” Subject 
 
In calling attention to infancy, old age, sickness, and 
death, Fineman reminds readers that the legal subject is lodged 
in and indissoluble from a human body.57 Yet, the vulnerability of 
the human person is not only a product of the body’s temporal 
finitude, but also of the body’s status as a living system. Even the 
body of a healthy, non-disabled, adult human is dependent upon 
complex interactions inside and outside the body that her mind is 
seldom aware of, let alone able to control.58 Vulnerability is thus 
produced not only by human interdependency, but also the 
interdependency of the human body with a complex array of 
nonhuman and trans-human systems. A healthy adult human can 
only be considered separate from her environment by willfully 
forgetting this interdependency.  
Based on these observations, postmodern and feminist 
theorists of materiality, such as political theorist Jane Bennett, 
argue that the conventional split between “humans” and “the 
environment” is profoundly misleading.59 “The environment” is 
inside each person, and human activity shapes “the 
environment.”60 The body, in sickness and in health, can be seen 
as a set of relationships and interactions that constantly cross the 
border between self and other.61 From this perspective, political 
responsibility extends not only to the social and economic 
institutions that mediate our fundamental vulnerability, but also 
the web of human and trans-human relationships and 
institutions that enable and mediate human life on earth.62 
The remainder of this Part introduces ideas developed by 
ecological economists and biologists that support this expansion 
 
57.  See Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable, supra note 25, at 86 
(explaining the inevitable physical dependence all humans face as they go 
through childhood, illness, disability, and old age).  
58. See infra Part II.B.2.  
59. See JANE BENNETT, VIBRANT MATTER 111–13 (2010) (discussing 
“vital materiality” theory which argues that humans are on a horizontal 
ontological plane with non-humans and the environment).  
60.  See id. at 111 (differentiating environmentalism from 
materiality theory in that “environmentalists are sevles who live on earth, [and] 
vital materialists are selves who live as earth”). 
61. See infra Part II.B.2.  
62. See infra Part II.B.1.  
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of Fineman’s theory—a concept I am calling “ecological 
vulnerability.” Building on these ideas, this Article suggests that 
Fineman’s conception of the embodied, and therefore vulnerable, 
subject should include not only awareness of the human life 
course, but the recognition that in each moment of that life course 
humans exist only in, and because of, complex relations of 
“interbeing”63 with nonhuman and nonliving systems.  
 
 
63.  The term “interbeing” has been popularized by Thich Nhat 
Hanh, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk, teacher, author, poet, and peace activist. 
Thich Nhat Hanh, PLUM VILLAGE, http://plumvillage.org/about/thich-nhat-hanh/ 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2014) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). In 1966 Hanh founded the “Order of 
Interbeing” (Tiep Hien in Vietnamese) as “a community of monastics and lay 
people who have committed to living their lives in accord with the Fourteen 
Mindfulness Trainings, a distillation of the Bodhisattva (Enlightened Being) 
teachings of Mahayana Buddhism.” Order of Interbeing, PLUM VILLAGE, 
http://plumvillage.org/about/order-of-interbeing/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). Hanh offers this example to explain the term: 
If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud 
floating in this sheet of paper. Without a cloud, there will be 
no rain; without rain, the trees cannot grow; and without 
trees, we cannot make paper. The cloud is essential for the 
paper to exist. . . . So we can say that the cloud and the 
paper inter-are. 
 
If we look into this sheet of paper even more deeply, we can 
see the sunshine in it. If the sunshine is not there, the forest 
cannot grow. . . . And if we continue to look, we can see the 
logger who cut the tree and brought it to the mill to be 
transformed into paper. And we see the wheat. We know 
that the logger cannot exist without his daily bread, and 
therefore that the wheat that became his bread is also in 
this sheet of paper . . . . The fact is that this sheet of paper 
is also made up of “non-paper elements.” . . . As thin as this 
sheet of paper is, it contains everything in the universe in it. 
THICH NHAT HANH, ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 55–56 (Robert 
Ellsberg ed., 2001). 
The term “interbeing” is also associated with a fundamental Buddhist 
concept, translated as “dependent origination” or “dependent co-arising.” 
Religious scholar David L. McMahan explains that as an empirical description, 
dependent origination “represents the world as a vast, interconnected web of 
internally related beings—that is, whose identity is not a priori independent of 
the systems they are a part of but is inseparable from those systems.” DAVID L. 
MCMAHAN, THE MAKING OF BUDDHIST MODERNISM 150 (2008). 
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1. “Outside Ecologies:” Macro-Level Vulnerability 
 
 At a macro-level of scale, all human life is engaged with, 
and depends on, both the ecological “web of life” and oceanic and 
atmospheric systems that provide living beings with “natural 
services.” Recognition of human dependence on these 
relationships extends our understanding of what it means to be 
individually and collectively vulnerable.  
 Support for this view can be found in recent policy and 
theoretical efforts to develop assessment systems for quantifying 
ecosystem processes. For example, in 2000 then-United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan called for an international project 
known as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), which 
involved the work of more than 1,360 experts from 95 countries.64 
Carried out between 2001 and 2005, the objective of the MA was 
“to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-
being and the scientific basis for action needed to enhance the 
conservation and sustainable use of those systems and their 
contribution to human well-being.”65 Similar to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,66 the MA 
assembled and synthesized already-existing research and data; 
its purpose was to assist policymaking regarding environmental 
international conventions.67 
 
64. See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND 
HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS, at ii, vii (2005), available at 
www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf (providing 
background for the inception of and contributions to the MA).  
 65. See id. at v (stating the purpose of the assessment and the 
years it took place); see also Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are 
Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL 
ECOSYSTEMS 3 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (defining and explaining the 
concept of ecosystem services). 
66. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, History, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml (last visited July 
31, 2014) (“The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was created in 
1988. It was set up by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to prepare, based on available 
scientific information, assessments on all aspects of climate change and its 
impacts, with a view of formulating realistic response strategies.”) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
67.  See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 64, at v 
(“The MA did not aim to generate new primary knowledge, but instead sought to 
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 In its synthesis report, the MA defined an ecosystem as “a 
dynamic complex of plant, animal, and microorganism 
communities and the nonliving environment interacting as a 
functional unit,” and defined “ecosystem services” as “the benefits 
people obtain from ecosystems.”68 The MA identifies four types of 
ecosystem services: (1) provisioning services, which include food, 
water, timber and fiber, (2) regulating services, such as the 
regulation of climate, floods and waste treatment, (3) cultural 
services, such as recreation and aesthetic enjoyment, and (4) 
supporting services such as soil formation, pollination and 
nutrient cycling.69  
 An important impetus for the MA’s project was to 
intervene in economic policymaking and economic theory.70 
Under conventional neoclassical economics, ecosystem services 
were undervalued or not valued at all.71 In the second half of the 
twentieth century, however, certain sub-disciplines of economic 
theory, including “environmental economics” and “ecological 
economics,” began attempting to identify and value ecosystem 
services.72 Although the two sub-fields differ in their qualitative 
framework, both environmental economics and ecological 
economics “overlap in the use of specific techniques to measure 
                                                                                                             
add value to existing information by collating, evaluating, summarizing, 
interpreting, and communicating it in a useful form.”). 
 68. See id. (defining ecosystem and ecosystem services). 
 69. See id. (distinguishing the four types of ecosystem services). 
70.  See id. (stating that the MA was focused on the exploration of 
policy questions). 
 71. See e.g. Erik Gomez-Baggethun, Rudolf de Groot, Pedro L. 
Lomas & Carlos Montes, The History of Ecosystem Services in Economic Theory 
and Practice: From Early Notions to Markets and Payment Schemes, 69 
ECOLOGICAL ECON., Nov. 3, 2009, at 4 (explaining a statement made by 
economist Robert Solow that capital could substitute for land, so that scarcity of 
land need not be figured into economic calculations: “The world can, in effect, 
get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a 
catastrophe”). 
72.  See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental 
Economics: A Survey, 30 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 675, 675 (1992) (describing 
how economists responded to the “environmental revolution” of the 1960’s, 
resulting in the emergence of environmental economics); see also Costanza, 
supra note 32, at 3 (“Ecological economics is a new transdisciplinary field of 
study that addresses the relationships between ecosystems and economic 
systems in the broadest sense.”). 
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sustainability, evaluate policies and assist decision-making.”73 
The goal of both is to make economic analysis more consistent 
with the physical world it describes, both in the service of 
accurate science and in the service of better policymaking.74 
Without recognition of the resources provided by the natural 
world and their limits, the devotion of conventional economic 
policymaking to endless growth threatens life on the planet.75  
 As an example, the ecosystem services provided by or 
facilitated by water are perhaps not well understood by most 
humans, yet are necessary to our continued existence. Marcia 
Stanton explains: 
 
Healthy aquatic ecosystems depend on water 
quality, flow and adequate temperature so as to 
maintain their capacity to provide services. Once 
these needs are met, they provide several services 
such as climate and hydrological regulation; 
nutrient distribution and primary production; 
sheltering, breeding, and habitat for many species; 
waste dilution and detoxification, prevention from 
soil erosion and siltation, and a buffer against 
natural hazards.76 
 
 Although schemes for monetizing ecosystem services have 
been criticized, and arguments continue about the particular 
prices or values that should be placed on various services, it is not 
 
 73. See Gomez-Baggethun, supra note 71, at 4. These authors, a 
group of ecological economists, explain the difference as follows: 
Environmental Economics operates mainly within the axiomatic 
framework of Neoclassical Economics – e.g. theory of consumer choice, 
perfect information, and marginal productivity theory of distribution. 
Ecological Economics challenges some of these assumptions and 
conceptualizes the economic system as an open subsystem of the 
ecosphere exchanging energy, materials and waste flows with the social 
and ecological systems with which it co-evolves. Id. (citations omitted). 
74. See id. at 6 (explaining the impact on science and on 
policymaking).  
75. See id. at 4–5 (challenging models of economic growth in which 
natural resources are absent).  
 76.  Marcia Silva Stanton, Payments for Freshwater Ecosystems 
Services: A Framework for Analysis, 18 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
189, 219 (2012). 
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disputed that human life and health depends on the integrity of 
these services.77 As the MA synthesis report puts it, “people are 
integral parts of ecosystems and . . . a dynamic interaction exists 
between them and other parts of ecosystems, with the changing 
human condition driving, both directly and indirectly, changes in 
ecosystems and thereby causing changes in human well-being.”78 
The report concludes, “The human species, while buffered against 
environmental changes by culture and technology, is 
fundamentally dependent on the flow of ecosystem services.”79  
 The effort to describe these services and quantify them in 
precise economic terms is itself a “vulnerability” project: an effort 
to make human vulnerability visible within conventional 
economics. As Douglas Kysar puts it, “ecological economists view 
the human economy as a subsystem of the environment, while 
conventional economists view the environment as a subsystem of 
the economy.”80 From an ecological economist’s perspective, the 
conventional view assumes human invulnerability, creating the 
risk that unending economic growth will eventually threaten the 
carrying capacity of the earth.81 Ecological economics, and 
projects such as measurements of and payments for ecological 
services, attempt instead to recognize the natural limits of 
human markets.82  
 
77. See Daily, supra note 65, at 3–5 (analogizing colonizing the 
moon to highlight the necessity of viable ecosystem services). 
 78. See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 64, at v. 
The MEA identifies human well-being as containing multiple constituents, 
including “the basic material for a good life, such as secure and adequate 
livelihoods, enough food at all times, shelter, clothing, and access to goods; 
health, including feeling well and having a healthy physical environment, such 
as clean air and access to clean water; good social relations, including social 
cohesion, mutual respect, and the ability to help others and provide for children; 
security, including secure access to natural and other resources, personal safety, 
and security from natural and human-made disasters; and freedom of choice and 
action, including the opportunity to achieve what an individual values doing and 
being.” Id.  
 79. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND 
TRENDS, in 1 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, at vii (Rashid M. Hassan et 
al. eds., 2005). 
 80. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, supra note 24, at 728.  
81. See id. at 676 (arguing that mainstream economics fails to 
fully recognize the limits of the environment, and therefore fails to provide a 
sound basis for policymaking).  
82. See id. at 677 (“Significantly, ecological economists rely on a 
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Global climate change represents the most dramatic 
example of this indivisibility of humans and “the environment.” 
For instance, in its Fifth Assessment Synthesis Report, released 
in 2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
underscored the close interrelationship between greenhouse gas 
emissions, large-scale ecosystem and trans-human system 
disruptions, and human life and health.83 In this report, the IPCC 
stated with “high confidence” that global warming is 
anthropogenic—that is, caused by human activity.84 Moreover, 
according to the IPCC the physical effects of global warming now 
threaten human life and human institutions. Summarizing 
recent changes in atmospheric and oceanic systems as well as 
taking note of species extinctions, the IPCC identified threats to 
food production and to water availability and supply as two 
specific examples of increased human vulnerability caused by 
global climate change.85 The IPCC report predicts, with a high 
degree of confidence, increases in human ill-health for the 
remainder of the twenty-first century.86 In the longer term, the 
report predicts—again with a high level of confidence—that 
“[w]ithout additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place 
today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st 
                                                                                                             
preanalytic vision of human activity that is presumed to be bounded by natural 
constraints.”).  
83. SEE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 15–16 (Rajendra 
K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2014), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr1.pdf (reporting the predicted effects of 
climate change on urban and rural areas as well as its effects on economies and 
poverty) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
84. Id. at 4 (“Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have 
increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and 
population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are 
unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with 
those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate 
system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century.”). 
85. See id. at 15–16 (listing the predicted effects of climate change 
on various human populations). 
86.  See id. at 15 (expecting with “high confidence” that 
“[t]hroughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases 
in ill-health in many regions). 
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century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, 
and irreversible impacts globally.”87 This assessment supports 
the conclusion that as a species, humanity’s fate is tied up with 
that of “the environment,” and that to attempt to promote human 
flourishing without regard to ecosystem functioning would be a 
grave mistake in the Anthropocene era.  
Finally, the IPCC report recognizes that political and social 
relationships and institutions mediate the effects of global 
climate change, and that the projects of mitigation and 
adaptation raise issues of equity, justice, and fairness.88 We will 
return to this point below. 
 
 2. “Inside Ecologies:” Micro-Level Vulnerability 
 
The trans-human nature of the embodied self, and the 
vulnerability that it entails, extends not only into the macro-
realm of ecosystems but also into the micro-realm of human 
biology. It is, of course, obvious that human beings are in 
constant interaction with their environments.89 Recent 
 
87.  Id. at 18. For example, the report identifies five “Reasons For 
Concern” (RFCs), defined as “aggregate climate change risks” that “illustrate 
the implications of warming and of adaptation limits for people, economies, and 
ecosystems across sectors and regions.” Id. These RFCs are associated with: “(1) 
[u]nique and threatened systems, (2) [e]xtreme weather events, (3) [d]istribution 
of impacts, (4) [g]lobal aggregate impacts, and (5) [l]arge-scale singular events.” 
Id. Each RFC is an example of human vulnerability in the face of continued 
global warming. 
88.  See id. at 17 (explaining how equity, justice, and fairness 
should be included in developing mitigation strategies). 
89.  As Bonnie Spanier puts it: 
[O]rganisms do not exist apart from their environs or from 
other organisms. Not only are organisms surrounded by and 
embedded in a dynamic interaction with their environs—and in 
that sense are contiguous with it—but we are contiguous with 
the environment from the inside as well, whether through our 
digestive and respiratory tracts, our skin pores, or the network 
of endoplasmic reticulum throughout the cytoplasm of many 
types of cells. . . . A very different psychology of self and other 
would understand our beings as open to and connected with the 
environment around us through our external and internal 
surfaces, as well as what we project of ourselves (our 
exhalations, body head radiation, wastes, etc.). 
 
BONNIE B. SPANIER, IMPARTIAL SCIENCE: GENDER IDEOLOGY IN MOLECULAR 
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developments in microbiology, however, reveal in startling detail 
that each individual human body can be understood as a complex 
ecosystem made up of interdependent living entities, and that the 
whole’s survival and flourishing depends on the health of the 
individual parts and their interrelations.90  
The Human Microbiome Project (hereafter HMP), a multi-
national scientific endeavor building on the Human Genome 
Project, is on the cutting edge of this research.91 For example, 
HMP scientists have discovered approximately 100 trillion “good 
bacteria” that live in and on each human body.92 This human 
“microbiome” performs a number of important services, including 
food digestion, synthesis of vitamins, and protection against 
disease-causing bacteria.93 Malfunctions in the microbiome, 
                                                                                                             
BIOLOGY 89 (1995). Richard Lewontin concurs: “[O]rganisms do not simply use 
resources present in the environment but, through their life activities, produce 
such resources and manufacture their environments.” Richard Lewontin, It’s 
Even Less in Your Genes, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 26, 2011), 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/may/26/its-even-
less-your-genes/ (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). According to Lewontin, this view is shared by 
renowned scientist Evelyn Fox Keller. In a review of her book, The Mirage of a 
Space Between Nature and Nurture, Lewontin describes Keller’s titular mirage 
as “our false division of the world into living objects without sufficient 
consideration of the external milieu in which they are embedded, since 
organisms help create effective environments through their own life activities.” 
Id. 
90.  See generally Peter J. Turnbaugh et al., The Human 
Microbiome Project: Exploring the Microbial Part of Ourselves in a Changing 
World, 449 NATURE 804 (Oct 18, 2007) (outlining “a strategy to understand the 
microbial components of the human genetic and metabolic landscape). 
91.   See David A. Relman, Microbiology: Learning About Who We 
Are, 486 NATURE 194, 194 (Jun. 14, 2012) (listing efforts in various countries to 
study the human microbiome); see also Turnbaugh et al., supra note 90, at 804 
(“The HMP is not a single project. It is an inter-disciplinary effort consisting of 
multiple projects, which are now being launched concurrently worldwide, 
including in the United States (as part of the next phase of the National 
Institutes of Health’s Roadmap for Medical Research), Europe and Asia.”). 
92. See Gina Kolata, In Good Health? Thank your 100 Trillion 
Bacteria, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/health/human-microbiome-project-decodes-
our-100-trillion-good-bacteria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining the work 
and findings of the Human Microbiome Project) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
93. See id. (explaining the role of microbes in the human body). It 
appears that there are distinct communities of microbes that live in sites such 
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including disturbances caused by antibiotics, are now being 
linked to maladies such as metabolic syndrome (a precursor of 
Type II diabetes), obesity, and some infections.94  
More broadly, the HMP’s research has prompted a 
rethinking of how scientists define the human body. As one group 
of researchers associated with the HMP explains: 
 
[M]any were surprised and perhaps humbled by the 
announcement that the human genome contains 
only ~20,000 protein-coding genes, not much 
different from the fruitfly genome. However, if the 
view of what constitutes a human is extended, then 
it is clear that 100,000 genes is probably an under-
estimate. The microorganisms that live inside and 
on humans (known as the microbiota) are estimated 
to outnumber human somatic and germ cells by a 
factor of ten. Together, the genomes of these 
microbial symbionts (collectively defined as the 
microbiome) provide traits that humans did not need 
to evolve on their own. If humans are thought of as a 
composite of microbial and human cells, the human 
genetic landscape as an aggregate of the genes in the 
human genome and the microbiome, and human 
metabolic features as a blend of human and 
microbial traits, then the picture that emerges is one 
of a human ‘supra-organism.’95 
  
The journalist Michael Pollan puts it this way: 
 
It turns out that we are only 10 percent human: for 
every human cell that is intrinsic to our body, there 
are about 10 resident microbes—including 
                                                                                                             
as the skin, in the gut, and in the vagina, and that there is surprising diversity 
among individuals in the composition of these microbial populations. See 
generally, THE HUMAN MICROBIOME PROJECT CONSORTIUM, Structure, Function, 
and Diversity of the Healthy Human Microbiome, 486 NATURE 207, 207 (June 
14, 2012) (setting out results of the “largest cohort and set of distinct, clinically 
relevant body habitats so far”). 
94. See Kolata, supra note 92 (discussing how essential these 
bacteria are to human health and functioning). 
95.  Turnbaugh et al., supra note 90, at 804 (citations omitted). 
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commensals (generally harmless freeloaders) and 
mutualists (favor traders) and, in only a tiny 
number of cases, pathogens. To the extent that we 
are bearers of genetic information, more than 99 
percent of it is microbial.96 
 
 As a consequence of this discovery, “[h]uman health 
should now ‘be thought of as a collective property of the human-
associated microbiota,’ as one group of researchers recently 
concluded in a landmark review article on microbial ecology—
that is, as a function of the community, not the individual.”97 
Microbiologists have borrowed terms and concepts from ecology in 
order to express this new understanding of the human being as a 
collective. For instance, one article asserts that “each person can 
be viewed as an island-like ‘patch’ of habitat occupied by 
microbial assemblages formed by the fundamental processes of 
community ecology: dispersal, local diversification, environmental 
selection, and ecological drift.”98 Pollan quotes Justin 
Sonnenburg, a microbiologist at Stanford University, who even 
suggests that “we would do well to begin regarding the human 
body as ‘an elaborate vessel optimized for the growth and spread 
of our microbial inhabitants.’”99 From the perspective of research 
on the microbial biome, humans and microbes are 
interdependent, forming complex systems that defy the 
conventional understanding of human beings are distinct and 
 
 96. Michael Pollan, Some of My Best Friends Are Germs, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 15, 2013, .http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/magazine/say-hello-
to-the-100-trillion-bacteria-that-make-up-your-
microbiome.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 97. See id. (citing Courtney J. Robinson, Brendan J.M. Bohannan 
& Vincent B. Young, From Structure to Function: the Ecology of Host-Associated 
Microbial Communities, 74 MICROBIAL AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY REV. 453 
(2010)). 
 98. Elizabeth K. Costello et al., The Application of Ecological 
Theory Toward an Understanding of the Human Microbiome, 336 SCIENCE 1255, 
1255 (June 2013), available at 
www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6086/1255.full.pdf (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
 99. Pollan, supra note 96.  
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independent living entities.100 “The” embodied self is not singular 
at all, but rather a community of co-evolving species.101 
 One implication of this framing of the human being as a 
collective or an ecosystem is a new appreciation of human 
vulnerability.102 Commenting on several recent studies, David A. 
Relman writes, “We are essentially blind to many of the services 
that our microbial ecosystems provide—and on which our health 
depends—and investigators desperately need new approaches for 
studying interactions between members of the microbial 
community and their human hosts.”103 One area of concern is the 
widespread use of antibiotics in the Western world, not only to 
treat diseases but as a preventive measure in industrial 
agriculture and in a wide range of domestic consumer uses.104 
Another ongoing area of research is the extent to which childhood 
exposure to microbes protects health, by preventing the 
development of allergies and possibly other autoimmune 
disorders.105 Meanwhile, Pollan reports, “[a] handful of 
 
100. See id. (arguing that human health should be considered “as a 
function of the community, not the individual”).  
101. See id., (explaining that the human immune system must 
“learn to consider our mutualists—e.g., resident bacteria—as self too”) (quoting 
Michael Fischbach). 
102.  See Sabrina Tavernise, Antibiotics in Animals Tied to Risk of 
Human Infection, N.Y. TIMES (January 28, 2014), 
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/science/antibiotics-in-animals-tied-to-risk-of-
human-infection.html (discussing the unforeseen consequences for human 
health from giving antibiotics to livestock) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
103.  Relman, supra note 91, at 195 (citations omitted). 
 104. See, e.g., Tavernise, supra note 102; Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. 
Restricts Antibiotics Use for Livestock, N.Y. TIMES, December 11, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/health/fda-to-phase-out-use-of-some-
antibiotics-in-animals-raised-for-meat.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); 
Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Questions Safety of Antibacterial Soaps, N.Y. TIMES 
(December 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/health/fda-to-require-
proof-that-antibacterial-soaps-are-safe.html (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 105. See, e.g., Jane E. Brody, Eating Dirt Can Be Good For You – 
Just Ask Babies, N.Y. TIMES (January 27, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/health/27iht-
snbabies.1.19711937.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Anahad O’Connor, 
Sucking Your Child’s Pacifier Clean May Have Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 
2013), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/why-dirty-pacifiers-may-be-
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microbiologists have begun sounding the alarm about our 
civilization’s unwitting destruction of the human microbiome and 
its consequences. Important microbial species may have already 
gone extinct, before we have had a chance to learn who they are 
or what they do.”106 The microbial interchanges between human 
beings and nonhuman entities and environments make visible 
the extent to which human existence is an emergent property, 
made possible only through complex trans-human processes that 
make us vulnerable in ways we do not even yet fully understand.  
 
C. Summary: Ecological Vulnerability 
 
Just as the feminist “dependency critique”107 refocused 
attention from the autonomy of adult individuals to the webs of 
social dependency and interdependency that sustain the rights-
bearing subject, recent developments in economics and the 
natural sciences require us to reject the idea of an autonomous 
political subject separate and distinct from an inert 
“environment.”108 Humans are dependent not only on one another 
but on a series of trans-human systems, and this interdependence 
is a source of resilience—and vulnerability.109  
 
Recognizing that human beings are born, age, sicken, and 
die is the first step to recognizing that theories of political 
existence and obligation must take account of the natural world. 
If the state is to be fully responsive to all the conditions beyond 
the individual’s control that affect his or her ability to flourish, as 
Fineman suggests, then it must take into account the internal 
                                                                                                             
your-childs-friend/ (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 106. Pollan, supra note 96. 
 107. See EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, 
EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 18 (1999) (noting the source of the phrase 
“dependency critique” and describing the it as an effort to enlarge our 
conception of equality to include the “values and virtues of care”). 
108. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 110–12 (questioning whether the 
belief that the environment is responsive to human actions is the most effective 
way to understand the relationship between humans and non-humans).  
109. See id. at 116 (“It is futile to seek a pure nature unpolluted by 
humanity, and it is foolish to define the self as something purely human. . . A 
vital materialism . . . recasts the self in the light of its intrinsically polluted 
nature and in so doing recasts what counts as self-interest.”). 
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and external ecologies in which humans are situated. “Ecological 
vulnerability” recognizes that human lives are part of complex 
ecosystems that operate on various levels of scale, from the local 
to the global. Particularly in the age of the Anthropocene, when 
human activity is rapidly causing large-scale, not fully 
predictable, and potentially irreversible changes to our inner and 
outer environments, the fully responsive state should recognize 
that soil degradation, water scarcity, warming oceans, and 
depleted fishing stocks structure our options and create 
opportunities just as market and family relations do. In the age of 
the Anthropocene, it can no longer be argued that these 
environmental processes and events are outside the circle of 
justice. “Human behavior” and “the natural world” are now 
locked in an ever-tightening feedback loop. To care for its citizens, 
the responsive state must care for the systems that make its 
citizens’ flourishing possible. 
Advances in microbiology as well as ecological economics 
underscore the recognition of interdependency on which 
ecological vulnerability analysis rests. As the previous section 
outlined, humans depend on complex but as-yet poorly 
understood microbial ecosystems for life and health. To fully 
respond to embodied humans who, among other things, fall ill 
and die, the responsive state must pay attention to the processes 
that sustain and threaten its citizens’ bodies. Moreover, just as 
the health of macro-ecosystems is closely tied to the operation of 
human institutions, especially economic institutions, so the 
health of our micro-ecologies is affected by human behavior, 
including the practices of industrial agriculture.110 The feedback 
loops in which humans are embedded in the microbial world must 
be reflected in feedback loops of governance. 
Ecological vulnerability recognizes that the responsive 
state’s political obligations entail obligations to nonhuman 
entities and processes. Taking the full measure of human 
vulnerability means recognizing the “interbeing” of humanity 
with nonhuman and trans-human systems and entities. 
Ecological vulnerability thus expands our concept of what it 
means to be a citizen.  
 
 
110.  See supra note 102, 104 and 105 and accompanying text 
(sources discussing the role of antibiotics in disrupting human microbiomes). 
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III.  Some Governance Implications of Ecological 
Vulnerability 
 
 As Part II argued, ecological economists, climate 
scientists, and microbiologists have begun to increasingly 
appreciate the fragile materiality of human existence. Not only is 
each human being “embodied” in a life course, subject to growth, 
aging, illness, and death; embodiment entails enmeshment in 
complex trans-human systems on macro- and micro-levels that 
are essential to human survival and flourishing. What are the 
implications for political and legal theory of reframing the rights-
bearing self and the state in this way?  
 A number of scholars from various fields that take 
embodiment seriously—including feminist theory, materialist 
theory, political theory, environmental humanities, and public 
health—explore the political implications of the idea that 
“humans” and “the environment” are not separate and distinct, 
and that “the environment” is not an inert space in which 
humans exercise agency.111 The new theories of materiality and 
embodiment described in subsection A of this Part rewrite the 
imaginary “state of nature” that the classic liberal political 
philosophers—including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau—used as their backdrop for imagining the 
social contract. New theories of materialism and the body treat 
the “state of nature” as a dynamic flux of human and nonhuman 
relations.112 From this reimagined state of nature might emerge a 
“natural contract” within which the social contract is embedded—
not to mention, as one of the wilder theoretical visions has it, a 
“viscous porosity” beyond the reach of conventional politics, 
where “[w]ord, flesh, and dirt are no longer discrete.”113  
 Building on this literature, subsection B sets out two 
foundational principles or commitments that might guide 
political and legal thought under an ecological vulnerability 
 
111. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
112. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at x (introducing the importance of 
nonhumans interacting with humans).  
 113. STACY ALAIMO, BODILY NATURES: SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND 
THE MATERIAL SELF 14 (2010) (citing Nancy Tuana, Viscous Porosity: Witnessing 
Hurricane Katrina, in MATERIAL FEMINISMS 188 (Stacy Alaimo & Susan 
Henkman eds., 2007)). 
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framework. The first is the principle that environmental 
protection and the protection of human rights are inextricably 
intertwined. The second is a principle that we might name simply 
“humility,” but which appears in the critical literature as the 
anti-subordination principle. These two principles, I suggest, 
ought to be considered central to a legal theory of ecological 
vulnerability.  
 To fully flesh out how these two principles might be 
reflected in legal doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. In 
Subsection C, however, I identify some models for this project, 
already visible in the literature of “just sustainabilities,” in the 
work of the environmental justice movement, and in recent legal 
developments in Latin America. 
 
A. Theories of Materiality: Reenvisioning the “State of 
Nature”  
 
In the last decade of the twentieth century and into the 
first decade of the twenty-first, social theorists in a number of 
disciplines began to chafe against the assumption that everything 
important to human relations is “socially constructed.”114 A new 
literature, described as the “materialist turn,” has emerged 
asserting a role for the non-human and the trans-human in social 
relations and institutions.115  
The “social construction thesis” originally arose as a way 
to counter the claim that social hierarchies of race, gender, 
disability and sexuality are the result of “nature” and therefore 
are unchangeable and nonpolitical.116 For example, critical race 
theorists argue vigorously that humans are not divided into races 
the way animals are divided into species; that the physical 
differences people associate with “race” are matters of convention 
and do not represent an underlying biological reality; and that 
 
114. See infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.  
115. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.  
116.  See Ron Mallon, A Field Guide to Social Construction, 2 PHIL. 
COMPASS 94, 102 (2007) (“Talk of social constructions has been a provocative, if 
sometimes confusing, spur to consider historical, cultural, and personal details 
that shape our theories, our social worlds, and ourselves.”); see also IAN 
HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 6 (1999) (explaining that 
“[s]ocial construction work is critical of the status quo. Social constructionists of 
X tend to hold that: (1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is.”).  
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who counts as a “white person,” a “black person,” or an “Asian” 
person is determined primarily by history and politics rather 
than science.117  
The social construction thesis has not only been the basis 
for theoretical challenges to white supremacy and male 
domination, but also a powerful springboard for social action on 
behalf of equality.118 Over time, however, the claim that a thing 
was “socially constructed” became practically a reflex in some 
 
117.  See Mallon, supra note 116 at 97 (discussing how constructive 
theory argues that human attributes like race are defined through social 
interactions, rather than being innate characteristics of humans). Critical race 
theorists in law, for instance, argue that legal institutions help determine what 
“race” means. See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1997) (showing how the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the federal naturalization laws helped determine which individuals and 
groups were deemed “white” in American history); ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT 
BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008) (arguing that 
courtroom trials to determine the race of an individual have often turned more 
on that individual’s social ties and self-presentation than on ancestry and 
appearance). 
One of the most extensive applications of the social construction thesis 
is its use to support women’s equality. See HACKING, supra note 116, at 7 (“One 
core idea of early gender theorists was that biological differences between the 
sexes do not determine gender, gender attributes, or gender relations. Before 
feminists began their work, this was far from obvious.”). 
 118. To take a recent example, the social construction thesis has 
been used in the context of disability rights to counter the notion that 
“handicapped” people are naturally unable to participate in mainstream society. 
As Michael Ashley Stein and Penelope J.S. Stein explain, disability rights 
advocates have adopted a “social model” of disability rather than the medical 
model. See Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil 
Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1203 (2007). Under the social model of disability, 
disability arises through a combination of natural capacities and institutional 
arrangements. See id. at 1206–07. The equality principle requires that the state 
rectify institutional arrangements that impede the full participation of 
“disabled” people in social and political activities. See id. at 1205–06. This model 
has had important legal and policy implications; as they note, the landmark 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act “was premised on the social model's 
belief that peoples’ functional limitations are caused by the socially constructed 
environment, such that the repercussions of having a disability are mutable.” 
Id. at 1209. Stein notes that this social constructionist model of disability built 
on theories of social construction that similarly framed race and gender as 
“socially constructed” rather than “natural” categories of existence. See Michael 
Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 604 (2004). 
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academic quarters.119 The “materialist turn” in the humanities 
emerged as a challenge to this reflex. Materialist scholars 
acknowledge that not everything is socially constructed. They are 
interested in what lies beyond human institutions, perceptions, 
concepts, and decisions, including nonhuman actors and 
processes and the relationships between humans and 
nonhumans.120 
 
119. Ian Hacking, for instance, was able to fill an entire page with 
book titles that included the term “social construction.” See HACKING, supra note 
116, at 1. Hacking comments, “Talk of social construction has become common 
coin, valuable for political activists and familiar to anyone who comes across 
current debates about race, gender, culture, or science.” Id. at 2.  
 120. One important thread of the materialist turn comes through 
feminist theory. Feminist theorists initially divided “gender” from “sex” as a way 
of supporting the argument that conventional sex roles are not biologically but 
rather politically, historically, and socially determined. See Nancy Tuana, 
Fleshing Gender, Sexing the Body: Refiguring the Sex/Gender Distinction, 35 S. 
J. OF PHIL. 53, 54–55 (1996) (quoting ANNE MINAS, GENDER BASICS: FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND MEN 4 (1993)). In this distinction, “sex” 
represented what was given by nature and “gender” what was culturally 
negotiated, and the feminist argument was that “gender” was much more 
significant than most people assumed. Id. Introducing the notion of gender 
marked the issue of women’s capacities as political, not simply a matter for 
scientific experts. Id. However, the sex-gender binary was also problematic, both 
because of its instability (where does one draw the line between culture and 
biology?), and because it left the (natural) body outside feminism. Id. at 55. 
Feminist theorists like Elizabeth Grosz began to reject the distinction altogether 
and to claim “the body” as an object that belonged neither to nature nor to 
culture, but equally to both. ELIZABETH GROSZ, VOLATILE BODIES: TOWARD A 
CORPOREAL FEMINISM 23 (1994). Grosz, for example, described the body as a 
“threshold or borderline concept that hovers perilously and undecidably at the 
pivotal point of binary pairs. The body is neither—while also being both—the 
private or the public, self or other, natural or cultural, psychical or social, 
instinctive or learned, genetically or environmentally determined.” Id. By the 
2000s, a number of feminists had joined Grosz and called for “material 
feminisms.” See generally, MATERIAL FEMINISMS (Stacy Alaimo & Susan 
Hekman eds., 2008) (collection of essays embracing material feminism). 
A second element of the materialist turn comes from science and 
technology studies. In a landmark essay published in the mid-1980s, Donna 
Haraway sought to break down a number of theoretical dichotomies that in her 
view were not helpful to progressive social theory, including the dichotomy 
between “nature” and “culture.” Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: 
Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s, 80 SOCIALIST REVIEW 
65, 71 (1985). A philosopher of science, Haraway argued that an anti-scientific, 
anti-technological search for organic authenticity and purity too often motivated 
progressive political thinking, and she celebrated the “cyborg”—a figure neither 
purely natural nor purely artificial—as a more appropriate subject of 
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contemporary times. Id. at 74–76. Haraway’s work, in turn, explicitly rested on 
the work of women of color theorists, such as Chela Sandoval, Gloria Anzaldua, 
and Cherrie Moraga, who emphasized “hybridity,” mestizaje, and “racial 
borderlands” as key terms for anti-subordinationist theorizing. Id. at 73–74, 94–
95; see also generally Chela Sandoval, U.S. Third World Feminism: The Theory 
and Method of Oppositional Consciousness in the Postmodern World, 10 
GENDERS 1 (1991) (explaining the hybrid character of differential consciousness 
in that it attempts to unite multiple, seemingly different, ideologies); GLORIA 
ANZALDUA, BORDERLANDS / LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA (4th ed. 2012) 
(compilation of poetry and essays describing the hybrid identity of a Chicana 
and lesbian activist); THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL 
WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherríe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 3rd ed. 2002) 
(highlighting third world feminists’ struggles amidst white feminism). More 
recently, physicist and feminist Karen Barad argues that quantum theory has 
important implications for philosophy and social theory because it similarly 
scrambles binary terms like nature and culture. See KAREN BARAD, MEETING THE 
UNIVERSE HALFWAY: QUANTUM PHYSICS AND THE ENTANGLEMENT OF MATTER AND 
MEANING 26–27 (2007).  
Meanwhile, science and technology scholars such as Bruno Latour came 
to their interest in materiality through suspicion of the conventional methods 
and assumptions of sociology, which place “the social” and thus human action at 
the center of everything important. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE 
SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY 75 (2005) (highlighting 
the constraints of viewing from a social perspective). One outgrowth of their 
resistance to traditional sociology is “actor-network theory” or ANT, also called 
“material semiotics.” This approach to science and technology refuses to 
privilege human activities and actors; it instead views “all kinds of actors 
including objects, subjects, human beings, machines, animals, ‘nature,’ ideas, 
organizations, inequalities, scale and sizes, and geographical arrangements” as 
equally deserving of curiosity and interest in the working of complex systems, 
rather than automatically giving human “social” categories, intentions, and 
interests pride of place. See John Law, Actor Network Theory and Material 
Semiotics, in THE NEW BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL THEORY 141 (Bryan S. 
Turner ed., 2009) (introducing actor network theory). 
Yet a third element of the materialist turn is the environmental 
humanities and the study of “material culture.” See generally, LINDA NASH, 
INESCAPABLE ECOLOGIES: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENT, DISEASE, AND KNOWLEDGE 
(2006); Margaret FitzSimmons and David Goodman, Incorporating Nature: 
Environmental Narratives and the Reproduction of Food, in REMAKING REALITY: 
NATURE AT THE MILLENNIUM 194 (Bruce Braun & Noel Castree eds., 1998) 
(arguing how nature should be included in social theory); BILL BROWN, A SENSE 
OF THINGS: THE OBJECT MATTER OF AMERICAN LITERATURE (2003). These scholars 
look at the social world through objects and nonhuman systems, and like Grosz 
and Haraway treat nature and culture not as opposites but as thoroughly 
entangled. 
Finally, philosophy, especially its phenomenology branch, and political 
theory have contributed to materiality theory. See generally BENNETT, supra 
note 1 (explaining how political theory has contributed to materiality theory); 
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Out of materialist theory comes a dynamic and reciprocal 
systems view of the relationship between humans and the 
environment. Stacy Alaimo, for instance, has argued, “the 
environment, which is too often imagined as inert, empty space or 
as a resource for human use, is, in fact, a world of fleshy beings 
with their own needs, claims, and actions.”121 Alaimo calls her 
analytic framework “trans-corporeality,” and argues that the 
concept “opens up a mobile space that acknowledges the often 
unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman 
creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, and other 
actors.”122 Similarly, Elizabeth Grosz argues that people “need to 
understand the body, not as an organism or entity in itself, but as 
a system, or series of open-ended systems, functioning within 
other huge systems it cannot control through which it can access 
and acquire its abilities and capacities.”123 This understanding 
lies close to the understanding of the human body within 
disability studies. For instance, Rosemarie Garland-Thompson 
writes, “[A]ll bodies are shaped by their environments from the 
moment of conception. We transform constantly in response to 
our surroundings and register history on our bodies. The changes 
that occur when body encounters world are what we call 
disability.”124 
                                                                                                             
SARA AHMED, QUEER PHENOMENOLOGY: ORIENTATIONS, OBJECTS, OTHERS (2006) 
(explaining that queer phenomenology highlights “how bodies become orient[ed] 
by how they take up time and space”); IAN BOGOST, ALIEN PHENOMENOLOGY, OR 
WHAT IT’S LIKE TO BE A THING (2012) (arguing that humans should not be the 
center of philosophy but rather on a equal plane with the rest of the elements of 
the world).  
For a good overview of the materialist turn and a useful reflection on 
the relationship between the new materialist scholarship and more traditional 
scholarship in political economy, see generally Christopher Breu, The Insistence 
of the Material: Theorizing Materiality and Biopolitics in the Era of 
Globalization, (Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, 
Globalization Working Papers 12/2, 2012), available at 
socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/institute-on-globalization-and-the-human-
condition/documents/IGHC-WPS_12-2_Breu.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 121. ALAIMO, supra note 113, at 2. 
 122. Id. 
 123. ELIZABETH GROSZ, THE NICK OF TIME: POLITICS, EVOLUTION, AND 
THE UNTIMELY 3 (2004). 
 124. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Disability and Representation, 
120 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION 522, 524 (2005). 
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Political theorist Jane Bennett, who attempts to 
investigate “the vitality of matter” and attributes agency to 
nonhuman objects, concedes that her seemingly contradictory and 
quixotic endeavor is designed to interrogate human means and 
ends: 
 
[M]y hunch is that the image of dead or thoroughly 
instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and 
our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and 
consumption. It does so by preventing us from 
detecting (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, 
feeling) a fuller range of the nonhuman powers 
circulating around and within human bodies. . . . 
The figure of an intrinsically inanimate matter 
may be one of the impediments to the emergence of 
more ecological and more materially sustainable 
modes of production and consumption.125 
 
Bennett thus seeks to bring the nonhuman into political 
theory in the service of a humanist goal, “a self-interested or 
conative concern for human survival and happiness.”126 She cites 
social theorist Felix Guattari, who notes that because the health 
of the planet is increasingly reliant on human intervention, a 
politics that relies on keeping nature safe from humans will soon 
be ineffective.127 Instead, Guattari argues, people should stop 
trying to disentangle nature from culture and understand the 
environmental, social, and psychic realms as intertwined: “if we 
have a humanistic interest in a richer kinship, marital, or civic 
life, we had better pursue a more ecological sustainable 
relationship with nonhuman nature.”128 Guattari concludes that 
“a greener self-culture-nature will require not only new ‘laws, 
decrees and bureaucratic programmes’ but ‘new micropolitical 
 
 125. BENNETT, supra note 1, at ix. 
 126. See id. at ix–x (describing Bennett’s goal in using dominance 
theory in relation to environmentalism). 
 127. See id. at 114 (citing FELIX GUATTARI, THREE ECOLOGIES 4 
(1986) (“Structuralism and subsequently postmodernism, have accustomed us to 
a vision of the world drained of the significance of human interventions 
embodied as they are in concrete politics and micropolitics.”). 
 128. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 113 (citing GUATTARI, supra note 
127, at 27). 
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and microsocial practices, new solidarities, a new gentleness, 
together with new aesthetic and new analytic practices regarding 
the formation of the unconscious.’”129 Similarly, Bruno Latour 
understands the modern self as “entangled—cosmically, 
biotechnologically, medically, virally, pharmacologically—with 
nonhuman nature,” and argues for a politics and for policies that 
openly acknowledge this fact rather than attempting to 
disentangle nature from non-nature.130 
What distinguishes this “cyborg constitutionalism”131 from 
conventional approaches to environmentalism is, first, an 
acceptance of the human proclivity for constantly altering our 
relationships with nonhuman environments, a penchant for 
transformation that Marx described as our “species-nature.”132 
Materialist politics is not the kind of romantic environmentalism 
in which one denounces “technology” and seeks an imaginary 
past when people “lived in harmony with nature.”133 Second, a 
materialist approach to environmental politics displays humility 
about the possibilities of perfect knowledge of and control over 
either humans or their environments.134 It acknowledges that 
nonhuman systems sometimes act as if they have a will of their 
own, a will that cannot always be anticipated in advance.135 
Materialist approaches to technology are thus distinguishable 
from the “posthuman” ideology popular in Silicon Valley circles, 
 
 129. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 114 (quoting GUATTARI, supra note 
127, at 51). 
 130. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 115–16 (citing Bruno Latour 
arguing in favor of a holistic view of both human and nonhuman nature). 
131.  The term is a play on Donna Haraway’s famous essay called “A 
Cyborg Manifesto.” See Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs, supra note 120. 
 132. See Angela P. Harris, Compassion and Critique, 1 COLUM. J. 
RACE & L. 326, 333 (2012) (“[I]ntrinsic to human species-being is the capacity 
and urge to make things and, in the process, to re-create oneself and all of 
nature.”). 
133. For a critique of this fantasy as applied to representations of 
the Amazon, see Candace Slater, Amazonia as Edenic Narrative, in UNCOMMON 
GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 114 (William Cronon ed., 
1996). 
134. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 113 (explaining the need for a 
joint view of both nature and culture). 
135. See ALAIMO, supra note 113, at 1 (“[T]rans-corporeality also 
opens up a mobile space that acknowledges the often unpredictable and 
unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman creatures, ecological systems, 
chemical agents, and other actors.”).  
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which anticipates a technological “singularity,” a moment in 
which human nature will be supplanted by a more perfect 
machine nature, either through technologically-assisted 
immortality of the body or forms of artificial intelligence that will 
surpass human intelligence.136  
In line with this humility, materialist theorists reject the 
Enlightenment tradition that envisions Man as dominating 
Nature.137 In the place of fantasies about perfect control over the 
material world, or submission to a perfect “second nature” 
emerging from technology, for example, Donna Haraway sees the 
ideal relationship between humans and nonhumans as a playful 
and reciprocal “worlding” among “companion species.”138 
Although humans can and will attempt to get and keep the upper 
hand in these relationships, for Haraway the ultimate path of 
any worlding can neither be controlled nor even predicted.139 In 
her view, “[t]here is no assured happy or unhappy ending—
socially, ecologically, or scientifically. There is only the chance for 
getting on together with some grace.”140 
To conclude, theorists of materiality suggest that we 
should think of the human subject not as an autonomous and 
 
 136. See generally JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A 
MANIFESTO (2011) (critiquing post-humanist thinking from the perspective of a 
Silicon Valley insider); EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING CLICK HERE: THE 
FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013) (debating the credibility of 
technological solutionist views that technology can appropriately address 
complex social and environmental issues). 
 137. See generally CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE: 
WOMEN, ECOLOGY, AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1980) (providing a classic, 
explicitly feminist critique of Enlightenment theories of human dominance). 
Although this ideology is often associated with the Judeo-Christian tradition 
through the text in Genesis in which God gave dominion over the entire nature 
world to Adam in Genesis 1:25–27, it is possible to understand that text as 
requiring stewardship rather than raw exploitation. See MATTHEW SCULLY, 
DOMINION: THE POWER OF MAN, THE SUFFERING OF ANIMALS, AND THE CALL TO 
MERCY 70 (2002) (citing Roger Scrunton, Eat Animals! Its’ for Their Own Good, 
L.A. TIMES (July 25, 1991), articles.latimes.com/1991-07-25/local/me-
54_1_animal-rights (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 138. See DONNA J. HARAWAY, WHEN SPECIES MEET 182–83 (2008) 
(describing relationships between humans and competitive “companion 
species”—specifically retrieving dogs). 
139. See ALAIMO, supra note 113, at 2 (explaining the 
unpredictability of both human bodies, nonhuman beings, and nature itself). 
 140. HARAWAY, WHEN SPECIES MEET, supra note 138, at 15. 
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active figure set in, or exercising dominion over, an inert and 
passive environment, but as a being that constantly interacts 
with nonhuman actors at various levels of scale, in ecologies 
small and large.141 They adopt a vision of fundamental 
interdependence, not only with other humans but with 
nonhuman entities and processes.142 Their contributions to a 
political theory of ecological vulnerability invite us to 
acknowledge, respond to, and even celebrate the “trans-
corporeality” of human being. 
 
B. Two First Principles of Governance in Light of Ecological 
Vulnerability 
 
How might these ideas about “trans-corporeality” and 
“worlding” be reflected in law? In this subsection, I suggest two 
principles of governance from an ecological vulnerability 
perspective. The first is a commitment to seeing human rights 
and environmental sustainability as inextricably intertwined (the 
indivisibility principle). The second is a commitment to anti-
subordination—a commitment that includes being willing to 
subject vulnerability analysis itself to critical scrutiny (the 
antidiscrimination principle).  
 
1. The Indivisibility Principle  
 
If the human subject is inextricable from its environment, 
care for macro- and micro-ecologies is a central and indispensable 
obligation of the state—a condition of the state’s continued 
existence and legitimacy. Of course, governments already protect 
the environment in various ways. What ecological vulnerability 
requires is a recognition that the duty to protect the environment 
is on par with the duty to protect human rights.143 
 
141. See ALAIMO, supra note 113, at 2–3 (challenging the view that 
humans control the environment and suggesting that all beings are linked 
together and are interdependent).  
142. See id. at 2 (“Imagining human corporeality as trans-
corporeality, in which the human is always intermeshed with the more-than-
human world, underlines the extent to which the substance of the human is 
ultimately inseparable from the environment.”).  
143. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1727 
(suggesting a positive duty of the state to act on behalf on humans by 
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The government might reflect this recognition in the form 
of strong constitutional or statutory norms, such as a 
“precautionary principle” to protect human health, various anti-
pollution regimes, and commitments to public health, including, 
for example, principles of food justice.144 More radically, such an 
obligation might destabilize the public-private split that 
characterizes Anglo-American jurisprudence, undermining the 
assumption that common law individualist rights of property and 
contract, for instance, are more fundamental than environmental 
obligations.145 As in South Africa, where equality norms are 
considered “horizontal,” applicable to private as well as public 
law, we could imagine norms of ecological sustainability that 
applied horizontally throughout private and public law, rather 
than vertically from public law down to certain aspects of private 
activity.146 In these and other ways, the state should recognize 
sustainability as a fundamental value, not only by providing 
access to health care but by structuring family, market, and state 
                                                                                                             
addressing external and environmental issues).  
144 . On the precautionary principle, see Frank B. Cross, 
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 
851 (1996) (“The [precautionary] principle suggests that government should 
take precautions to protect public health and the environment, even in the 
absence of clear evidence of harm and notwithstanding the costs of such 
action.”). On food justice, see ROBERT GOTTLIEB & ANUPAMA JOSHI, FOOD JUSTICE, 
at ix (2013) (describing the food justice movement as “related to three key 
arenas for action: (i) seeking to challenge and restructure the dominant food 
system, (ii) providing a core focus on equity and disparities and the struggles by 
those who are most vulnerable, and (iii) establishing linkages and common goals 
with other forms of social justice activism and advocacy—whether immigrant 
rights, worker justice, transportation and access, or land use.”). 
145.  See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1756 (“All 
individuals are dependent on society’s institutions, be they deemed public or 
private and whether they are called family, market, or state entities, because it 
is through institutions that we gain access to resources with which to confront, 
ameliorate, satisfy, and compensate for our vulnerability.”); see also Kysar, Law, 
Environment, and Vision, supra note 24, at 677 (arguing for private as well as 
public environmental rights).  
146. See ANNE HUGHES, HUMAN DIGNITY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA AND IRELAND 156–57 (2014) (analyzing South African law that 
incorporates a total consideration of human dignity to promote horizontal 
rights); Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a 
Human-Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 80 (1999) (“Significantly, the 
final Bill of Rights not only binds the state (vertical application) but, to the 
extent that the nature of the rights permits, it also binds private and juristic 
persons (horizontal application).”).  
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activity around the recognition that life on earth depends on the 
continuing stability of certain crucial nonhuman systems and 
human-nonhuman interfaces and interactions.147 
 
2. The Anti-subordination Principle  
 
A second fundamental commitment necessary to a state 
responsive to ecological vulnerability is a commitment to the anti-
subordination principle.148 The anti-subordination principle is 
well-known and central to the work of critical legal scholars, from 
American Legal Realism through critical legal studies to critical 
race feminism.149  In the context of ecological vulnerability, the 
anti-subordination principle corrects a weakness within 
vulnerability theory itself: its susceptibility to universalizing 
language and policies that ignore social injustice and thereby 
perpetuate it. Commitment to anti-subordination makes visible 
the role of power in how people are treated and in how policy 
frameworks are developed.  
 
The international effort to curb global warming illustrates 
the pragmatic value of the anti-subordination principle as an 
element of environmental policy. Efforts to establish effective 
international treaties to curb global warming have in the past 
foundered on the problem of inequality between rich and poor 
countries.150 As several scholars have noted, “expanding the pie” 
 
147. See Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable, supra note 25, at 101 
(noting a particularized need for states to address the vulnerability connected to 
health care).  
148. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and 
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) (“Under the anti-
subordination perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to 
have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a whole.”). 
149.  See Berta Hernández-Truyól, Angela Harris & Francisco 
Valdes, Beyond the First Decade: A Forward-Looking History of LatCrit Theory, 
Community and Praxis, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 169, 172–177 (2006) (tracing 
history of anti-subordination critique in the American legal academy from 
American Legal Realism through LatCrit theory).  
150.  J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley Parks explain that inequality 
hinders international climate policy agreement in direct and indirect ways. 
First, “The extreme poverty of dozens of nations and the relative powerlessness 
of a larger number leaves them without the capacity to negotiate effectively 
with the North and unable to meaningfully address their emissions of 
greenhouse gases because of their extremely undeveloped economies and 
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through economic growth has long been treated as the answer to 
global economic inequality.151 If expanding the pie is no longer an 
option because of strict limits on fossil fuel use, however, then 
poor countries risk the inability to alleviate poverty through 
industrialization. Poor countries thus see climate change policy 
through a development lens, while rich countries tend to treat 
development issues as a distraction.152  
Carmen Gonzalez argues that at the root of this division 
between the rich and poor countries is a historic injustice: 
colonialism, which created the conditions for centuries of global 
environmental degradation and also gave rise to the language of 
“race” to justify complex systems of environmental and economic 
exploitation and political subordination.153 J. Timmons Roberts 
and Bradley Parks add that present-day socioeconomic 
inequalities stemming from this historic injustice are at the root 
of current tensions between rich and poor countries over climate 
adaptation and mitigation. They conclude, “Western nations need 
to wage a campaign to convince poor nations that they 
                                                                                                             
government agencies.” J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & BRADLEY C. PARKS, A CLIMATE OF 
INJUSTICE: GLOBAL INEQUALITY, NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS, AND CLIMATE POLICY 8 
(2007). Second, “The experience of poorer nations in the world economy and 
their interaction with rich nations across multiple issue areas has reinforced a 
worldview and a set of causal beliefs that are at odds with those of the wealthy 
nations; this has bred generalized mistrust and polarized expectations about 
how to proceed on climate issues.” Id. 
 151. See, e.g., M’Gonigle & Takeda, supra note 24, at 1012 
(“Economic growth, coupled with productivity-enhancing technology, has 
answered the demands of labor not by redistributing the economic pie, but by 
increasing its overall size.”); Brian Gilmore, The World Is Yours: “Degrowth,” 
Racial Inequality and Sustainability, 5 SUSTAINABILITY 1282, 1282–85 (2013) 
(introducing the problems with focusing on economic growth and calling for 
“degrowth”). 
152.  See ROBERTS & PARKS, supra note 150, at 229–30 (arguing that 
“the ongoing development crisis is at the very heart of the climate policy 
impasse” and that the “perception that the rich nations are promoting ‘do-as-I-
say-not-as-I-do’ policies is particularly damaging because successful transitions 
from carbon-intensive to climate-friendly development pathways will require 
‘deep’ cooperation between rich and poor nations, which must be underpinned by 
conditions of generalized trust and diffuse reciprocity.”). 
153.  See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Justice and 
International Environmental Law, Seattle University School of Law Legal Paper 
Series # 12–11, 7–8 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2011081 
(explaining how colonialism established these roots of inequality) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
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understand and care about their position in the international 
division of labor and want to help them to escape the scourge of 
poverty and structural vulnerability.”154 A shared commitment to 
the anti-subordination principle in the context of environmental 
crisis may help rich and poor countries move toward such a 
“shared worldview,” laying the foundation for the international 
trust and cooperation necessary to take comprehensive steps 
toward mitigation of and adaptation to global warming.155  
Beyond this purely pragmatic argument, the anti-
subordination principle elaborated by critical legal scholars also 
serves a related function: subjecting policy language and 
frameworks to critical scrutiny. Critical scholars have taken from 
postmodern theory a skeptical vigilance with regard to 
knowledge, especially taken-for-granted truths.156 A commitment 
to anti-subordination in the form of such skeptical vigilance 
fosters both justice for persons (human and non-human) and 
humility with respect to our knowledge of, and capacity to wisely 
interact with, the non-human world.157 
For example, Michael M’Gonigle and Louise Takeda 
observe that conventional environmental law and policy has until 
now taken place within a thoroughly “modernist” framework:  
 
[The assumptions of the modernist project] pervade 
environmental law: that (neutral) science can 
provide the knowledge to control environmental 
problems, and technology can provide the means; 
that markets can “internalize” externalities, and 
governments can act to make sure that they do if 
only they have “political will;” that progress is still 
possible under conditions and thinking inherited 
 
154.  ROBERTS & PARKS, supra note 150, at 217. 
155.  See id. at 230 (endorsing the position that under circumstances 
of extreme mistrust, it is more important for states to work toward establishing 
a “shared worldview” than to provide “strategic reassurance.”). 
156. See generally Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence 
of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994) (describing the “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” as a hallmark of critical race theory). 
157. See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 582 (1983) (“Every stabilized social world depends, for its 
serenity, upon the redefinition of power and preconception as legal right or 
practical necessity.”). 
6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014) 
 
142 
from an age long passed. All we really need is to do 
what is rational.158 
 
These assumptions badly need critical scrutiny, and the 
anti-subordination principle provides a vehicle for that scrutiny. 
Keenly aware of the human capacity for bending rationality in 
order to accommodate hierarchies of power, critical theorists 
constantly search discourses of truth and claims to objectivity 
and neutrality for evidence of bias.159 The hermeneutics of 
suspicion can yield a healthy humility and willingness to be self-
critical, qualities that are useful in a time of scientific 
uncertainty when the stakes are higher than ever in human 
history. Without this commitment, vulnerability theory lacks a 
similar meta-commitment to self-critique; indeed, insofar as it 
rests on the conception that there are some universal 
characteristics of the human condition, it risks complacency that 
we know who we are and what is to be done for everyone in the 
world.160 
This point takes us to a central weakness in the term 
“vulnerability” itself. This Article has argued that ecological 
vulnerability, understood as a fundamental condition of human 
existence to which the state must respond, usefully resituates the 
human subject within a trans-human world that must be 
protected and sustained in order for humanity itself to survive.161 
As it happens, however, “vulnerability” is already a key word of 
 
 158. M’Gonigle & Takeda, supra note 24 at 1106. 
159.  See Unger, supra note 157, at 582 (noting the importance of 
critical theory in addressing social problems).  
 160. See Ann-Belinda S. Preis, Human Rights as Cultural Practice: 
An Anthropological Critique, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 286, 288 (1996) (criticizing the 
effects of cultural relativism). In the discipline of cultural anthropology, for 
instance, postmodern theorists in the 1980s rebelled against their forerunners’ 
interest in identifying practices and ideals universal to all human cultures. Id. 
In the name of “cultural relativism,” anthropologists influenced by 
postmodernism questioned whether there were any such universal practices, 
and questioned whether, even if there were, the ability of Westerners to identify 
and describe them without bias. Id.  
161.  See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1754 
(“Considering the structural components of universal vulnerability raises a 
paradox: while human vulnerability is initially conceptualized as universal and 
constant, it also must be recognized that the experience of vulnerability is 
particular, varied, and unique on the individual level.”). 
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policy literature, and there it does not always mean what 
Fineman and I want it to mean.162  
To begin with, the term is widely used but has no agreed-
upon meaning. Hans-Martin Füssel observes: 
 
The ordinary use of the word “vulnerability” refers 
to the capacity to be wounded, i.e. the degree to 
which a system is likely to experience harm due to 
exposure to a hazard. The scientific use of 
“vulnerability” has its roots in geography and 
natural hazards research but this term is now a 
central concept in a variety of other research 
contexts such as ecology, public health, poverty and 
development, secure livelihoods and famine, 
sustainability science, land change, and climate 
impacts and adaptation. Vulnerability is 
conceptualized in very different ways by scholars 
from different knowledge domains, and even within 
the same domain. For instance, natural scientists 
and engineers tend to apply the term in a 
descriptive manner whereas social scientists tend 
to use it in the context of a specific explanatory 
model.163 
 
The many different meanings and uses of “vulnerability” 
make possible not only confusion and uncertainty, but uses of the 
term that are precisely opposite to the purpose of ecological 
vulnerability analysis. Fineman acknowledges, for instance, that 
 
162.  The problem may begin with semantics. Hans- Martin Füssel’s 
understanding of the ordinary meaning of the term as the capacity to be harmed 
describes a result, not the processes that led to the result. “Vulnerability” is 
easily made into an adjective characterizing people and groups, thus diverting 
attention from their institutional context. 
Using the same word to describe universal aspects of the human 
condition and to describe the complex ways in which the lives of some people are 
made more precarious than others makes it easy to avoid the problem of 
political inequality. Although Fineman’s argument that humans are all 
vulnerable (and that, at the same time, some are more vulnerable than others) 
makes perfect theoretical sense, the door is left open to mischief. 
163.  Hans-Martin Füssel, Vulnerability: A Generally Applicable 
Conceptual Framework for Climate Change Research, 17 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 155, 155 (2007) (citations omitted). 
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“vulnerability” can be used as a stigmatizing label that is applied 
only to some humans. As she observes, “[T]hose who are not seen 
as sufficiently autonomous and independent actors are herded 
together in designated ‘vulnerable populations’ and are 
susceptible to monitoring, discipline, and supervision.”164 
Fineman further observes, as we have seen, that populations 
considered insufficiently autonomous are often designated as 
either “deserving” or “undeserving.”165 The deserving 
vulnerable—like children—are treated with paternalism. The 
undeserving vulnerable—like the able-bodied poor—are managed 
through surveillance, discipline, and/or punishment.166 
Another example of how easily Fineman’s concept of 
vulnerability can be turned against itself can be taken from 
American environmental policy. “Plan EJ 2014” (Plan EJ) is a 
strategy document developed by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) as part of its mandate to incorporate principles of 
environmental justice in the implementation of its rules and 
 
 164.  Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable, supra note 25, at 84. 
165. See id. at 79 (discussing the view of elderly citizens as those 
who have contributed to society and thereby are deserving of accommodation). 
 166. See id at 85. Fineman puts it this way: 
 
If someone is very young, profoundly ill or disabled, or very old, we may 
not be comfortable demanding they conform to the mandates of self-
sufficiency and independence. They are perceived as needing protection, 
and paternalism guides society's response—which is to withhold 
agency, as is the case with children, or take away agency based on 
assumptions about lack of capacity, as we do with many of the elderly. 
   
 On the other hand, when someone is deemed a societal failure as the 
result of “choices” they have made, it is a different story. Poor single 
mothers, those who are unemployed and did not graduate from high 
school, those who were forced into default because they consented to 
terms in technically legal but morally indefensible contracts with 
aggressive financial institutions, and those who engaged in other risky 
or foolish behavior are seen as in need of discipline. We are concerned 
with the “moral hazard” implications should their bad choices be 
“rewarded” with societal support. . . . 
 
The third group determined to be a vulnerable population includes 
those deemed deviant and dangerous, such as prisoners or so-called 
“youth-at-risk” who engage in aggressive anti-social behavior. This 
group is determined to need even more discipline and control. They are 
often separated out from society in facilities, segregated and punished 
for their choices and behavior. (citations omitted). 
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rulemaking.167 Plan EJ does not use the word “vulnerable” in the 
main text of the document; instead, it speaks of “overburdened 
communities.”168 However, a footnote reveals that “overburdened 
communities” are defined in terms of vulnerability: 
 
In Plan EJ 2014, EPA uses the term 
“overburdened” to describe the minority, low-
income, tribal, and indigenous populations or 
communities in the United States that potentially 
experience disproportionate environmental harms 
and risks as a result of greater vulnerability to 
environmental hazards. This increased 
vulnerability may be attributable to an 
accumulation of both negative and lack of positive 
environmental, health, economic, or social 
conditions within these populations or 
communities.169 
 
 This definition connects vulnerability to economic and 
social conditions, as Fineman argues it should.170 Yet it does so in 
 
 167. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, PLAN EJ 2014, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014/plan-ej-2011-
09.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). Plan EJ 2014 was created with the 20th anniversary of 
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12898 in mind. Id. at i. Executive Order 
12898, promulgated in 1994, requires that: 
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, . . . each 
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its 
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations 
and low-income populations in the United States and its territories and 
possessions, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, and the Commonwealth of the Marian islands. Exec. Order No. 
12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 9629 (Feb. 26, 1994). 
168. See PLAN EJ 2014, supra note 167, at i (stating the goal of Plan 
EJ: “to more effectively protect human health and the environment for 
overburdened populations by developing and implementing guidance on 
incorporating environmental justice into EPA’s rulemaking process”).  
 169. Id. at 1, n. 1.  
170.  See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1755 
(arguing that “the variations in social location that are produced as the result of 
institutional practices and operations . . . becomes the most significant focus for 
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a fashion that makes relations of power and politics hard to see. 
In the Plan EJ passage, the disproportionate environmental 
harms attributed to minority, low-income, and indigenous 
communities are attributed to their greater vulnerability. This 
vulnerability is in turn attributed to the communities themselves, 
which have somehow accumulated “negative conditions” and lack 
“positive conditions.” In contrast, environmental justice 
advocates, using an anti-subordination lens to approach 
ecological vulnerability, have called attention to the role of social 
injustices, especially racism and poverty, in determining who and 
to what extent people suffer from environmental harms.171 
Without a robust commitment to anti-subordination, even a 
document claiming an explicit “justice” orientation, like Plan EJ, 
may use the language of vulnerability so as to avoid talking about 
the role of political and social subordination in making 
populations “vulnerable” in the first place.172 
This lack of attention to the role of power and privilege 
also has the capacity to influence the path of scientific research 
and technical expertise. For example, at a 2010 symposium 
entitled ‘‘Strengthening Environmental Justice Research and 
Decision Making: A Symposium on the Science of 
Disproportionate Environmental Health Impacts,’’ participants, 
including EPA officials, scientists, and representatives of 
community-based organizations, discussed EPA’s role in 
collecting and disseminating research on environmental health.173 
                                                                                                             
a vulnerability analysis.”).  
171. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: 
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
MOVEMENT 21 (2000) (noting that civil rights activists brought to the 
environmental justice movement “a perspective that recognized that the 
disproportionate impact of environmental hazards was not random or the result 
of ‘neutral’ decisions but a product of the same and social and economic 
structure which had produced de jure and de facto segregation and other racial 
oppression”). 
172. See Tom E.R.B. West, Environmental Justice and Internationl 
Climate Change Legislation: A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. 
REV. 129, 151 (“Climate change legislation has begun to address the former 
oversight through differentiated emission reduction targets in the Kyoto 
Protocol and acknowledgement of the special situations of certain vulnerable 
countries . . . .”). 
173. See Strengthening Environmental Justice Research and 
Decision Making: A Symposium on the Science of Disproportionate 
Environmental Health Impacts (Disproportionate Impacts Symposium), U.S. 
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Dayne Payne-Sturges, a co-organizer of the symposium, later 
reflected that “[s]ymposium participants were concerned that the 
EPA had not prioritized research on vulnerability, particularly 
the social and cultural aspects of it in the agency’s research 
programs.”174 Payne-Sturges further explains: 
 
EPA-supported research, assessments, and 
solutions are rarely aimed at why these hazards 
are there in the first place, at who and what 
systems create and maintain the observed 
racial/ethnic and class disparities in exposures or 
environmental degradation, and at what can be 
done to prevent these hazards from impacting the 
community. Focusing research and policies on the 
processes that lead to environmental inequities and 
then on the measures needed to alter these unjust 
processes (as opposed to focusing on single cases of 
environmental inequality) will likely lead to the 
greatest social and environmental improvements.175 
 
 The EPA is far from unique in employing the language of 
vulnerability to obscure the political and social roots of that 
vulnerability. The field of public health has been criticized for, as 
one scholar puts it, employing “a subtle assumption that the 
genesis of vulnerability and suffering is the individual and his or 
her choices.”176 In the public health literature, “vulnerability” is 
joined to other key words that obscure power, such as “risk” and 
“disparities.”177 Identifying the problem of “vulnerability” as the 
                                                                                                             
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/ncer/events/news/2010/03_17_10_calendar.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2014) (advertising the symposium and topics scheduled to be discussed) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT).  
 174. Devon Payne-Sturges, Humanizing Science at the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH SUPPLEMENT 1, at S8, 
S9 (2011). 
 175. Id. at S10. 
 176. Seth M. Holmes, Structural Vulnerability and Hierarchies of 
Ethnicity and Citizenship on the Farm, 30 MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: CROSS-
CULTURAL STUDIES IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS 425, 447 (2011). 
177. See Dayna B. Matthew, Disastrous Disasters: Restoring Civil 
Rights Protection for the Victims of the State in Natural Disasters, 2 J. HEALTH & 
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presence of “disparities” or “disproportionality” tends to call 
attention away from political and social injustices, as well as from 
how equality is being defined.178 Looking for “risk factors” that 
lead to disparities or disproportionality makes it easy to focus on 
characteristics of the individual or population under study, and 
not the institutional dynamics that contribute to those 
characteristics.179 Moreover, even where critics have shifted the 
public health discussion in a structural direction toward social 
institutions and dynamics of injustice such as racial 
discrimination (the so-called “upstream” factors contributing to 
vulnerability), some worry that researchers may fail to take 
account of “preservation through transformation”—
discrimination’s capacity to change form over time.180 Given the 
existing bias in policy analysis toward foregrounding the 
individual, “vulnerability” and its cognates are far too easily 
coopted. 
Thus, while Fineman may be right that a vulnerability 
analysis should call attention to the institutional conditions that 
construct that vulnerability, conventionally it is capable of doing 
just the opposite. Vulnerability, in policy analysis, is commonly 
treated as a fixed characteristic of the population or individual in 
question, rather than as the outcome of social and political 
relations.181 By obscuring the political and institutional 
                                                                                                             
BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 227 (2006) (discussing the application of Title VI of the Civil 
Right Act of 1964 to public health disparities resulting from national disasters).  
178. See id. at 248 (“The impact of racial and economic injustice is 
magnified when the very governmental authority charged with protecting and 
promoting public health, instead takes the occasion of a devastating hurricane, 
flood, earthquake, tornado or storm that is completely out of its control, to 
impose differential policies and procedures that are fully within its control.”).  
179. See id. (highlighting more pervasive and universal policies of 
injustice).  
 180. See e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, In the Shadow of Race: Women of 
Color in Health Disparities Policy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 1023, 1056 (2006) 
(commenting on a new “structural” approach to the study of health care 
disparities). Ikemoto suggests that the enthusiasm for identifying and attacking 
racial discrimination in the provision of health care and the training of health 
care workers, although it might do much good, “might not prevent the 
underlying ideologies from reconstituting into new practices and standards that 
would, in turn, undermine the gains made.” Id. Ikemoto calls for a “critical 
cultural inquiry” that would explicitly focus on power relations and draw on the 
work of critical theorists. See id.  
181. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1750 
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components of vulnerability, conventional policy analysis has the 
potential to portray domination as difference, and to hide the 
problem of unequal distribution of benefits and burdens within a 
universalist framework.182 Recognition of vulnerability must 
therefore be supplemented with an explicit commitment to the 
anti-subordination principle, which requires us to look for power 
and injustice even in our language and our frameworks for 
research and policy.183 
Feminist theorist Martha Minow saw a similar problem with 
the language of “difference” then pervading antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence.184 Identifying five “unstated assumptions” in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence about the nature of difference, 
Minow argued:  
 
Each of these assumptions bears the imprint of an 
historical association between power and the 
production of knowledge about the world. Thus, the 
characteristics and experiences of those people who 
have had power to construct legal rules and social 
arrangements also influence and reflect the dominant 
cultural expressions of what in different and what is 
normal.185  
 
                                                                                                             
(“Certain characteristics or identity markers associated with historic 
disadvantage also sometimes qualify for inclusion within vulnerable population 
status.”). 
182. See id. (“This targeted-group approach to vulnerability ignores 
its universality and inappropriately constructs relationships of difference and 
distance between individuals and groups within society.”). 
183. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track 
Theory, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 397, 412 (noting the legal realist idea that human 
knowledge and experience should influence analysis of law). 
184.  See generally Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (reviewing the 1986 Supreme Court Term and the 
issues of difference that arose). 
185.  Id. at 33. The five assumptions Minow found in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and subjected to critical scrutiny were: (1) that difference is 
intrinsic, not relational; (2) that the norm against which “difference” is judged 
may be left implicit and unstated; (3) that the observer can see without a 
perspective; (4) that other perspectives are irrelevant; and (5) that the status 
quo is natural, uncoerced, and good. Id. at 34–58 (challenging each assumption 
in detail). 
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In her critical analysis of these hidden assumptions, Minow 
acknowledged a debt to feminists, who have painstakingly sought 
to uncover the unstated assumptions underlying patriarchal 
power.186 Minow concluded that making “audible, in official 
arenas, the struggles over which version of reality will secure 
power” was the only way to do justice in a democracy.187  
A commitment to anti-subordination can provide a similar 
rigorous check on bias toward power within the framework of 
ecological vulnerability. A model of how this can be done can be 
seen in the field of social epidemiology, where Nancy Krieger 
champions an “eco-social” approach to the study of human health. 
Krieger argues that this approach to scientific research “can 
begin to elucidate population patterns of health, disease and well-
being as biological expressions of social relations, and can 
likewise begin to see how social relations influence our most basic 
understandings of biology and our social constructions of 
disease—thereby potentially generating new knowledge and new 
grounds for action.”188 In her view, a central construct of the eco-
social approach is “embodiment,” “a concept referring to how we 
literally incorporate, biologically, the material and social world in 
which we live, from conception to death; a corollary is that no 
aspect of our biology can be understood absent knowledge of 
history and individual and societal ways of living.”189 Krieger’s 
notion of embodiment captures both the indivisibility principle 
and the anti-subordination principle, and usefully turns each 
upon the other. 
This subsection has championed two complementary first 
principles for taking ecological vulnerability into account in legal 
 
186. See id. at 61 (“Leading feminists have contributed incisive 
critiques of the unstated assumptions behind political theory, law, bureaucracy, 
science, and social science. Their work exposes the dominance in field after field 
of conceptions of human nature that take a male as the reference point and 
treat women as “other,” “different,” “deviant,” “exceptional,” or baffling. 
Feminist work has thus named the power of naming and has challenged both 
the use of male measures and the assumption that women fail by them.”). 
187.  Id. at 95. For an even more radical call for multiple voices to be 
heard in struggles over how to define communities and set community rules, see 
generally BRUNO LATOUR, POLITICS OF NATURE: HOW TO BRING THE SCIENCES INTO 
DEMOCRACY (Catherine Porter trans., 2004). 
 188.  Nancy Krieger, Theories for Social Epidemiology in the 21st 
Century: An Ecosocial Perspective, 30 INT’L J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 668, 672 (2001). 
 189. Id. 
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and political theory. On the one hand, theories of social justice 
are incomplete without the recognition that the subject of justice 
is embedded within complex relations with the trans-human and 
non-human, vulnerable across the life span and not fully separate 
from the “environment” that sustains all life on the planet. On 
the other hand, without a commitment to anti-subordination, 
vulnerability theory threatens to become just another way to 
foster injustice. Dual commitments to indivisibility and anti-
subordination will help ensure the integrity of the ecological 
vulnerability framework. 
  
C. Existing Models for Ecological Vulnerability 
 
Although a complete account is beyond the scope of this 
Article, I want to end by acknowledging that the kind of 
intellectual, political, and legal projects suggested by the 
ecological vulnerability framework already exist. 
One intellectual project compatible with ecological 
vulnerability is Julian Agyeman’s concept of “just 
sustainability.”190 Just sustainability embraces just social 
relations among persons, and sustainable relations between 
humans and the nonhuman world (in its spatial dimension, 
preserving the web of life across the planet; and in its temporal 
dimension, preserving the web not just for a single generation, 
but for future generations).  Agyeman describes it as “the need to 
ensure a better quality of life for all, now and into the future, in a 
just and equitable manner, whilst living within the limits of 
supporting ecosystems.”191 In accordance with the indivisibility 
principle and the anti-subordination principle, Agyeman’s 
understanding of just sustainability links “the richer countries 
and the not-for-profits of the global North that want to discuss a 
 
 190. See e.g., JULIAN AGYEMAN, INTRODUCING JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: 
POLICY, PLANNING, AND PRACTICE 4–5 (2013) (arguing that social needs and 
welfare need to be included in the just sustainability theory); Julian Agyeman, 
Toward a “Just” Sustainability?, 22 CONTINUUM: JOURNAL OF MEDIA AND 
CULTURAL STUDIES 751, 755 (2010) (listing the four areas of concern for the Just 
Sustainability Paradigmas “(1) Quality of Life; (2) Present and Future 
Generations; (3) Justice and Equity; [and] (4) Living within Ecosystem Limits”). 
191. Agyeman, Toward a “Just” Sustainability?, supra note 190, at 
755 (citing JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 5 
(Julian Agyeman et al. eds., 2003)). 
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‘green’ agenda of environmental protection, biodiversity, and the 
protection of the ozone layer” with “those poorer ones in the 
South that are proponents of a ‘brown’ agenda of poverty 
alleviation, infrastructural development, health and 
education.”192 
The best example of an existing political project consonant 
with ecological vulnerability is the environmental justice 
movement. In 1991, organizers from the civil rights movement, 
the “anti-toxics” movement, indigenous nations, and the 
farmworkers’ movement came together at the first People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. and 
agreed upon seventeen “principles of environmental justice.”193 
The preamble to these principles states: 
 
We, the people of color, gathered together at this 
multinational People of Color Environmental 
Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national 
and international movement of all peoples of color 
to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and 
communities, do hereby re-establish our spiritual 
interdependence to the sacredness of our Mother 
Earth; to respect and celebrate each of our cultures, 
languages and beliefs about the natural world and 
our roles in healing ourselves; to ensure 
environmental justice; to promote economic 
alternatives which would contribute to the 
development of environmentally safe livelihoods; 
and, to secure our political, economic and cultural 
liberation that has been denied for over 500 years 
of colonization and oppression, resulting in the 
poisoning of our communities and land and the 
 
 192. Id. at 753. 
 193. See Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice 
Paradigm: Injustice Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental 
Discourses, 43 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 508, 539–42 (2000) (outlining and 
analyzing the Principles). For a general introduction to the U.S. environmental 
justice movement, see COLE & FOSTER, supra note 171. For an introduction to 
the global environmental justice movement, see RAMACHANDRA GUHA, 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2000). 
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genocide of our peoples, do affirm and adopt these 
Principles of Environmental Justice.194  
 
The principles expressed by the environmental justice 
advocates who gathered in Washington, D.C. in 1991 are fully in 
line with ecological vulnerability: care for the earth and for social 
justice simultaneously; an understanding that human life is 
inextricably intertwined with life and non-life, human and not, at 
many levels of scale; an understanding of political obligation as 
necessarily founded on obligations to the web of life that sustains 
the subjects of politics; and a commitment to critique, 
understanding that objectivity and neutrality are useful ideals 
but that we live in a non-ideal world shaped by domination. 
Finally, something quite similar to the framework I have 
named ecological vulnerability has already reached law and 
public policy in South America under the name of buen vivir, or 
vivir bien (literally, “the good life” or “living well”). Tracing the 
origins of buen vivir, Eduardo Gudynas identifies one of its 
sources as a critique of the practices and language of 
international development in the global South.195 Early uses of 
buen vivir, Gudynas explains, “highlighted the shortcomings and 
negative impacts of development projects implemented by 
governments and multilateral development banks in Latin 
America in the last decades.”196 Such projects, such as dams, 
unfortunately often led to disappointing results in terms of 
poverty reduction, while at the same time creating environmental 
 
 194. Principles of Economic Justice, Preamble: 1991 Leadership 
Summit, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE/ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, available at 
http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
195. See Eduardo Gudynas, Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow, 54 
DEVELOPMENT 441, 442 (2011) (explaining the origins of the buen vivir 
movement in South America). 
196. Id.; see generally Eduardo Gudynas & Alberto Acosta, La 
renovación de la critica desarrollo y el buen vivir como alternativa, J. 
SUSTAINABILITY EDUC. (Mar. 19, 2012) 
http://www.jsedimensions.org/wordpress/content/la-renovacion-de-la-critica-al-
desarrollo-y-el-buen-vivir-como-alternativa_2012_03/ (arguing that the ideals of 
buen vivir and its indigenous roots has led to the emergence of the “new left”) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
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havoc and distress in the communities they overshadowed.197 
More generally, the proponents of buen vivir are critical of 
resource extraction as the preferred development path for poor 
nations, for both social and environmental reasons.198  
According to Gudynas, the second origin point of buen 
vivir is positive rather than negative: Latin American indigenous 
philosophies that offer a radical alternative to the mindset and 
the practices of capitalism.199 As Gudynas notes, one of the best-
known sources of buen vivir is “the Ecuadorian concept of sumak 
kawsay, the kichwa [Quechua] wording for a fullness life in a 
community, together with other persons and Nature. More or less 
at the same time that sumak kawsay became spoken about in 
Ecuador in Bolivia a similar [A]ymara concept of suma qamaña 
emerged.”200 Another indigenous philosophy from the Guaraní 
people involves “ideas of the harmonious living (ñandereko), good 
 
197. See MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 181–82 (discussing the 
environmental and social harms of dam-building projects in the twentieth 
century). McNeill comments, “Dams displaced millions without compensation, 
perhaps 40 million over the course of the century, three-quarters of them in 
India and China.” Id. at 182. 
198.  See, e.g., Eduardo Gudynas, Extracciones, Extractivismos y 
Extrahecciones: Un Marco Conceptual sobre la Apropiacion de Recursos 
Naturales, 18 OBSERVATORIO DEL DESARROLLO 1, 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.extractivismo.com/documentos/GudynasApropiacionExtractivismoE
xtraheccionesOdeD2013.pdf (defining “extractivismo” as a type of natural 
resource extraction characterized by large volume or high intensity that is 
oriented toward foreign export of unprocessed or barely processed materials) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT); ROBERTS & PARKS, supra note 150, at 112 (using the term 
“extractive state” to describe “nations that are heavily dependent upon exports 
of raw and barely processed materials (mining and lumbering resources as well 
as ranching and plantation agriculture)” and noting that such states are also 
“notorious for their feeble domestic institutions”). Some scholars have 
nicknamed the combination of resource extraction and weak civil society 
institutions as “the resource curse.” See, e.g., Dustin N. Sharp, Requiem for a 
Pipedream: Oil, the World Bank, and the Need for Human Rights Assessments, 
25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 379, 379 (2011) (“More often than not, the revenues that 
should in theory be a great boon to development are in practice associated with 
disastrous human rights fallout as living standards actually decrease and 
governance indicators worsen, a phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’”). 
199.  See Gudynas, Buen Vivir, supra note 195, at 442 (discussing 
the indigenous origins of the buen vivir movement). 
200.  Id. at 442–43 
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life (teko kavi), the land without evil (ivi maraei) and the path to 
the noble life (qhapaj ñan).”201 
Arising from these dual origins, Gudynas argues, buen 
vivir has become the umbrella term for an ongoing multicultural 
dialogue around a variety of themes. One of these themes is “a 
reaction against the conventional domination of utilitarian 
values, particularly expressed in the reductionism of life to 
economic values and the subsequent commoditization of almost 
everything.”202 Another theme of buen vivir is the indivisibility 
principle, as Gudynas explains: 
 
Buen Vivir promotes the dissolution of the Society-
Nature dualism. Nature becomes part of the social 
world, and political communities could extend in 
some cases to the non-human. These include, as 
examples, the proposals of the biocentric 
environmental perspective, but also indigenous 
positions that recognize that the non-human (either 
animals, plants, ecosystems or spirits) have will 
and feelings. Thus, the polis is expanded, and the 
concept of citizenship is widened to include these 
other actors within environmental settings.203 
 
Buen vivir is not only an influential ideology in South 
America; in some nations it has been written into law. For 
example, in the most recent version of the Bolivian Constitution 
(approved in 2009), the term “Vivir Bien,” along with its Aymara 
and Guaraní cognates, is included in Title 1, Chapter 2, Article 8, 
the section devoted to the ethical and moral principles describing 
the values, ends, and objectives of the state.204 Moreover, the 
section links these terms to principles more familiar in the West, 
such as unity, equality, dignity, inclusion, equal opportunity, 
 
201.  See id. at 443 (describing buen vivir as “[a] plural endeavor”). 
202.  Id. at 445. 
203.  Id. 
204.  República del Bolivia, Constitución de 2009, Primera Parte, 
Título I, Capítulo Segundo, Artículo 8, (Bol.) available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.html [Bolivian 
Constitution] (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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freedom, solidarity, reciprocity, and social justice.205 This 
structure can be understood as incorporating the anti-
subordination principle as well as the indivisibility principle into 
Bolivian constitutional law. 
Statutory law has followed this constitutional lead. For 
example, in October of 2012 the legislative assembly of Bolivia 
approved a new law, the Act Concerning the Term “Madre Tierra” 
and Integrated Development for Vivir Bien (“the Madre Tierra 
Law”).206 Article 1 of the statute introduces the term “integrated 
development.” Integrated development, according to the statute, 
is to be undertaken in harmony and equilibrium with Mother 
Earth with the goals of fostering Vivir Bien, guaranteeing the 
regenerative capacity of the components and systems of life, and 
recovering and strengthening local and traditional knowledge.207 
The Madre Tierra Law defines “Mother Earth” in this way: 
 
Mother Earth is a living, dynamic system in 
conformance with the indivisible community of all 
living systems and living beings, interrelated, 
interdependent and complementary, sharing a 
common destiny. Mother Earth is considered 
sacred; it feeds and is a home that contains, 
sustains and reproduces all living beings, 
ecosystems, biodiversity, organic societies and the 
individuals that compose them.208 
 
205.  Id. 
206. Ley Marco De La Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral Para 
Vivir Bien [Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well Framework 
Law], Law No. 300, 15 de Octubre de 2012, art. 1 (Bol.) [hereinafter Madre 
Tierra Law]. 
207.  See Madre Tierra Law, art. 1, supra note 210 (“La presente 
Ley tiene por objecto establecer la vision y los fundamentos del desarrollo 
integral en armonía y equilibrio con la Madre Tierra para Vivir Bien, 
garantizando la continuidad de la capacidad de regeneración de los components 
y sistemas de vida de la Madre Tierra, recuperando y fortalenciendo los saberes 
locales y conocimientos ancestrales”). 
208.  Madre Tierra Law, art. 5, supra note 210 (Madre Tierra “es el 
Sistema viviente dinámico conformado por la comunidad indivisible de todos los 
sistemas de vida y los seres vivos, interrelacionados, interdependientes y 
complementarios, que comparten un destino común. La Madre Tierra es 
considerada sagrada; alimenta y es el hogar que contiene, sostiene y reproduce a 
todos los seres vivos, los ecosistemas, la biodiversidad, las sociedades orgánicas 
y los individuos que la componen.”). 




As two commentators explain,209 the law—treating 
“integrated development as inextricably intertwined with el vivir 
bien (defined as synonymous with the indigenous terms sumaj 
kamaňa, sumaj kausay, and yaiko kavi pave)—takes note of the 
poverty that afflicts many Bolivians, and declares it the 
obligation of the state to create the material conditions to 
guarantee self-determination. The law then sets out ten 
“objectives” and eleven “bases and orientations of integrated 
development.” Among these are norms concerning food security; 
protections for biodiversity and the country’s “genetic patrimony” 
(patrimonio genético) including the goal of moving away from 
reliance on genetically modified organisms; special procedural 
protections for forest areas being considered for development; and 
goals concerning sustainable energy, water consumption, and 
hazardous waste production.210 Finally, the law creates new 
administrative structures to promote these goals, including a 
national body with authority, in conjunction with the Central 
Bank of Bolivia, to promote mechanisms aimed at preventing and 
adapting to climate change.211 
Like the Bolivian Constitution, the Ecuadorian 
Constitution of 2008 incorporates the concept of buen vivir.212 
Title II, Chapter 2, entitled “Rights of Buen Vivir,” articulates a 
series of socioeconomic rights, including rights to water and food 
(section 1), rights to freedom of communication and conscience 
(section 3), and the right to health (section 7). Article 14 of this 
chapter includes among these rights of buen vivir the right of the 
population to live in an environment that is clean and in 
ecological balance, which will in turn guarantee sustainability 
 
209.  See René Orellana Halkyer & Diego Pacheco Balanza, La Ley 
Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, 479 AMERICA 
LATINA EN MOVIMIENTO 22 (2012). 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. 
212.  For a detailed review of the incorporation of buen vivir in the 
2008 Ecuadorian Constitution, see Alberto Acosta, “El Buen Vivir en el camino 
del post-desarrollo: Una lectura desde la Constitución de Montecristi,” Friedrich 
Ehberg Stiftung Policy Paper 9 (October 2010), available at 
http://cadtm.org/IMG/pdf/El_Buen_Vivir_en_el_camino_del_post-desarrollo-
_Una_lectura_desde_la_Constitucion_de_Montecristi.pdf (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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and buen vivir/sumak kawsay. 213 Title VI, Chapter 1, Article 275 
declares that, as a matter of general principles, economic 
development shall follow principles of buen vivir/sumak 
kawsay,214 and that buen vivir requires individuals, communities, 
peoples and nationalities to exercise their rights and 
responsibilities within a framework of multiculturalism, respect 
for diversity, and harmonious coexistence with nature.215 
Going further, the Ecuadorian Constitution also sets out 
in Title II, Chapter 7 a series of rights belonging to nature 
itself.216 For example, Article 71 of this chapter declares that 
Nature or Pachamama, as the place where life is reproduced and 
created, has the right to have its existence respected with 
integrity, and the right to the maintenance and regeneration of 
its vital cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes.217  
Like the ideal of “just sustainability,” the ideal of buen 
vivir incorporates the indivisibility principle. It treats human and 
non-human systems as inextricably intertwined and inter-
dependent, and rejects the conventional view that humans can 
and should dominate Nature. The Bolivian and Ecuadorian 
 
213.  See República del Ecuador, Constituciones de 2008 
[Constitution], Título II, Capítulo Segundo, Art. 14 (Ecuador) (“Se reconoce el 
derecho de la población a vivir en un ambiente sano y ecológicamente 
equilibrado, que garantice la sostenibilidad y el buen vivir, sumak kawsay.”), 
available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html#mozTocId70
5782 (last updated July 11, 2011) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
214.  See República del Ecuador, Constituciones de 2008 
[Constitution], Título VI, Capítulo Primero, Art. 275 (Ecuador) (“El régimen de 
desarrollo es el conjunto organizado, sostenible y dinámico de los sistemas 
económicos, políticos, socio-culturales y ambientales, que garantizan la 
realización del buen vivir, del sumak kawsay.”). 
215.  See id. (“El buen vivir requerirá que las personas, 
comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades gocen efectivamente de sus derechos, y 
ejerzan responsabilidades en el marco de la interculturalidad, del respeto a sus 
diversidades, y de la convivencia armónica con la naturaleza.”). 
216.  See República del Ecuador, Constituciones de 2008 
[Constitution], Título II, Capítulo Séptimo, “Derechos de la naturaleza” [rights 
of nature] (Ecuador). 
217.  See República del Ecuador, Constituciones de 2008 
[Constitution], Título II, Capítulo Séptimo, Art. 71 (Ecuador) (“La naturaleza o 
Pacha Mama, donde se reproduce y realiza la vida, tiene derecho a que se 
respete integralmente su existencia y el mantenimiento y regeneración de sus 
ciclos vitales, estructura, funciones y procesos evolutivos.”) 
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Constitutions and the Madre Tierra Law also reject the view that 
economic practices and institutions like markets are properly 
outside politics and that development comes first and 
redistribution later. At the same time, these constitutional and 
statutory texts incorporate the anti-subordination principle. They 
symbolically challenge the long domination of indigenous nations 
with their use of indigenous as well as Spanish terms for 
harmonious living, and the inclusion of multiple human rights, 
including socioeconomic rights, makes the commitment material 
as well as symbolic. As ecological vulnerability suggests, buen 
vivir, as incorporated in these constitutional and statutory 
doctrines, begins to rethink legal theory and legal practices and 
institutions in ways that foster the intertwining of social justice 




In a recent essay, Brian Gilmore examines recent calls for 
an international “degrowth” movement—a campaign for 
deliberate economic contraction in response to climate change.218 
Gilmore first takes note of the tension between rich and poor 
nations over climate mitigation and adaptation projects: 
 
How can the historically developed nations of high 
economic development now convince these 
developing nations that they should halt or 
significantly alter their economic development and 
growth and not seek to change the standard of 
living in their countries for the masses of people for 
the sake of sustaining a world population that has 
heretofore denied them participation? It is perhaps 
an impossible suggestion.219 
 
 As Gilmore goes on to observe, however, the tension 
between, on the one hand, the need to abandon economic 
“business as usual” for the sake of the human race as a whole, 
 
218.  See generally, Gilmore, supra note 151. In his essay, Gilmore 
refers to Serge Latouche’s 2009 book, Farewell to Growth, which advocates for 
“de-growth” but also calls for resistance to bias. Id. at 1286. 
219.  Id. at 1284. 
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and, on the other hand, the need to make recompense for the 
continuing injuries of slavery, colonialism, imperialism and 
discrimination is not only an international issue.220 Gilmore notes 
that African Americans—who are still, as a population, near the 
bottom of many U.S. measures of economic and social wellbeing—
have for years been promised “equal opportunity.”221 As the world 
now possibly turns toward economic contraction, Gilmore asks 
these questions: 
 
What will “degrowth” mean for black Americans, 
specifically beyond the individual choice or 
collective choice? 
 
Will it mean equality or will it mean a transition to 
a “degrowth” society, where the same enduring 
inequities persist? 
 
How will the transition from an unequal “growth” 
society be made and how will it be implemented? 
 
Are past injustices, such as slavery and “Jim Crow” 
laws, to be forgotten or dismissed for all times in 
light of “degrowth”? 
 
Is there any need to address these past injustices 
considering the goals of “degrowth”? 
 
What will guarantee more equality as the transition 
or semi-transition occurs? 
 
And will the implementation of “degrowth” models 
imperil personal freedoms of black Americans?222 
 
Fineman’s theory of vulnerability raises these same 
questions. This Article has argued that vulnerability theory offers 
 
220. See id. at 1283–85 (applying the degrowth tensions to the 
United States). 
221.  See id. at 1288–93 (discussing the history of slavery and 
measures of present-day economic inequality, including the racialized wealth 
gap). 
222.  Id. at 1293. 
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a way into rethinking political obligation in the age of the 
Anthropocene, by situating the human social contract within a 
“natural contract” that is trans-human but also constitutive of 
the human. Ecological vulnerability brings into political theory 
recognition of the full extent of human “fragile materiality,” and 
underscores the fact of the indivisibility of human flourishing and 
ecological balance.  
At the same time, vulnerability theory alone is insufficient 
to completely fulfill the promise of this mutual engagement 
between critical legal theory and environmental theory. 
Vulnerability is a universal condition of being human, but it does 
not burden all equally. Fineman’s notion of vulnerability rightly 
calls attention to the social institutions that mediate 
vulnerability and support resilience. Yet, attention to universal 
vulnerability can too easily become a means of ignoring specific 
injustices. A robust commitment to anti-subordination as well as 
indivisibility is required to truly incorporate social justice and 
environmental care. Together, the two principles can begin to 
assist us in responding to the challenges of the Anthropocene. 
 
 
